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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), appeals from his judgments 
of conviction after a jury found him guilty of the first-degree murders of Donna Fontaine 
("Donna") and her boyfriend Fred Palahniuk ("Fred"), conspiracy to commit first-degree 
murder, first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree arson and preparing false 
evidence, his sentences of death for first-degree murder and the denial of most of his 
claims for post-conviction relief. The state's cross-appeal challenges the district court's 
granting of post-conviction relief based upon Ring v. Arizonrh 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
setting aside Shackelford's death sentence and ordering he be resentenced. . 
Statement Of The Facts 
In December 1995, Donna married Shackelford in Missouri. (Tr., p.l82.) Prior 
to their marriage, during the summer of 1995, Donna toured the northwest and purchased 
some property about thirty minutes outside of Kendrick, Idaho, intending to build a home 
there. (Ir., pp.184-85, 188-89.) Donna's brother, Gary Fontaine ("Gary"), also had an 
interest in the property and was living there in May 1999. (Tr., pp. 431-32, 437.) 
After approximately one year, the couple's relationship began deteriorating (Tr., 
pp.187-88), becoming "bad" during the spring and summer of 1997 (Tr., p.193). The 
relationship ended in the summer of 1997, with the couple divorcing in November. (Tr., 
pp.201-02.) Shackelford repeatedly made disparaging remarks about Donna, including 
statements that he wished she "would die or one of these days you're going to die." (Tr., 
p.201.) Donna accused Shackelford of raping her in July 1997, but charges were not filed 
until 1998. (Tr., pp.253, 1638-39; Trial Exhibit 209.) In May 1999, Shackelford called 
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Donna and told her if she did not drop the rape case, he would kill her. (Tr., p.221.) 
During the summer of 1997, Donna's son, James Avery, saw Shackelford "pacing back 
and forth, kind of talking to himself out loud and somewhat talking to me. And he was 
saying, I don't know what I'm going to do. I don't know what I'm going to do with 
Donna if! catch her with another man I should kill them both." (Tr., p.280.) 
In the spring of 1999, Donna met Fred through a personal ad and developed a 
relationship with him. (Tr., pp.227-31.) On May 28, 1999, Donna and Fred returned to 
the home outside Kendrick where Gary was living. (Tr., pp.443-45.) The following 
morning, Donna, Fred and Gary went to the Locust Blossom Festival in Kendrick. (Tr., 
pp.453-60.) While there, they met John, Mary and Sonya Abitz. (Tr., p.461.) John and 
Mary were Gary's neighbors who lived just down the road. (Ir., pp.442-43.) Sonya was 
Mary's daughter and engaged to Shackelford. (Tr., pp.915, 2796.) 
That same date, Ted Meske, Mary's brother, who lived only 1200 feet from Mary 
(Tr., p.l093), stayed home working on a fence line (Tr., pp.l098-1101.) While working, 
Ted heard several gunshots. (Tr., pp.1110-13.) When Ted stopped working around 6:00 
he went to the Abitz's residence and talked about the festival. (Tr., pp.114-15.) 
Shackleford arrived, stating he did not want Douna to know he was there. (Tr., pp.1117-
18.) Approximately 20-25 minutes after Shackelford arrived, Gary called, reporting the 
garage was on fire. (Tr., pp.I120-21.) Gary had left the Abitz's residence around dark, 
returned home, saw Donna's pickup in the middle of the driveway and smelled smoke. 
(TT., pp.474-76.) Ted, Mary, Sonja arId Shackelford arrived at the fire and various 
individuals tried to extinguish the fire, but were unsuccessful. (Tr., pp.480-82, 1136-39.) 
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Deputy Richard Skiles was the first officer to alTive and found Gary, Ied, Mary, 
Sonja, Mary's son Brian Abitz, and Shackelford, with the structure "burned nearly to the 
ground." (Ir., pp.388, 391.) Based upon information obtained from Ied and 
Shackelford, Deputy Skiles contacted dispatch to have an on-call detective sent "because 
there was a possibility there could be a snicide victim in the fire." (Ir., pp.402-03.) 
Upon the arrival of the fire department, there was "nothing left." (Ir., p.1341.) 
Firefighters were advised it was a possible crime scene and merely put water on "hot 
spots" under the direction of deputies. (Ir., pp.1341-42.) While extingnishing "hot 
spots," two bodies were discovered (Ir., pp.l343-44), which were subsequently 
identified through dental records as Douna and Fred's remains. (Ir., pp.2278-2306.) 
Doctor Robert Cihak conducted autopsies of the remains, which were severely 
burned and charred. (Ir., p.2In.) Shotgun pellets were found in Donna's right chest 
region and a bullet was in the back of her neck. (Ir., pp.2181-83.) Dr. Cihak opined the 
bullet wound was fatal, was inflicted when Donna was still alive and she was dead at the 
time of the fire. (Ir., pp.2192, 2195-96.) A bullet was also found in Fred's body behind 
the upper breastbone, which Dr. Cihak concluded was the cause of death. (Ir., pp.2208, 
2215.) Fred was also dead at the time of the fire. (Ir., p.2215.) Dr. Cihak also 
explained, based upon food fragments in Fred's stomach, that his best "guesstimate" 
regarding Fred's time of death was anywhere from Yz to 3 hours after having consumed a 
meal consistent with food at the Locust Blossom Festival. (Ir., pp.2211-22.) 
Firearms expert Lucien Haag compared the two bullets recovered from the 
respective bodies and opined, "One gun had fired both of these bullets, they both had 
come down the same gun barre!." (Ir., pp.24n-78.) Haag also opined the same gun 
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fired a third bullet recovered at the fire scene between the two bodies. (Tr., pp.2479-80.) 
During the crime scene investigation, a badly burned semi-automatic .32 caliber pistol 
was recovered between the two bodies (Tr., pp.770-76), which was identified as Donna's 
(Tr., p.l252). Despite the condition of the gun, Haag was able to produce two test-fires 
(Tr., pp.2458-59), and based upon the test-fire and examination of the gun, opined the 
gun could not be excluded as the murder weapon (Tr., p.2482). 
During the course of the investigation, Shackelford gave numerous written and 
oral statements, including grand jury testimony, not only to law enforcement officers, but 
other individuals, most of which were very inconsistent. (See Trial Exhibits 48,110,117, 
143, 146, 152, 154, 156, 181, 186, 187, 190, 192, 194, 197, 201.)1 Shackelford also 
made implicit admissions. For example, Proctor James Baker ("PJ") testified that the day 
before the murders Shackelford drove to his home, said, "Donna is no more," and asked 
PJ to provide him with an alibi. (Tr., pp.1914-16.) The following day when Shackelford 
returned he failed to respond when PJ said, "I think you did it." (Tr., p.1919.) 
As a result of the investigation, it was learned that Shackelford had conspired with 
numerous individuals to have DOlll1a murdered. Two of those co-conspirators, Martha 
Millar and Bernadette Lasater, testified at trial, detailing the facts related to the 
conspiracy to murder DOlll1a. (Tr., pp.2919-3238, 3242-3589.) 
Course Of The Proceedings 
On February 11, 2000, an Indictment was filed charging Shackelford with two 
counts of first-degree murder, first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree 
I The state recognizes some of the listed exhibits are transcripts which were entered only 
for illustrative purposes. For ease of the Court and the parties, the state has referred to 
the transcripts and not the audiotapes. 
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murder, conspiracy to commit arson and preparing false evidence. (R., pp.1-4.) At his 
initial arraignment, Shackelford was provided the opportunity to have counsel appointed, 
but due to his failure to complete the financial form, his arraignment was continued for 
one day. CR., pp.25-27.) The following day Shackelford's Financial Statement was filed, 
and Ray Barker and Steven Mahaffey were appointed to represent Shackelford. (R., 
pp.28-30, 34-35.) Because the state had filed notice to seek the death penalty (R., pp.3l-
32), a hearing regarding counsels' qualifications was held the following day, with the 
district court concluding counsel were qualified to represent Shackelford (R., p.44). 
Trial began on October 16, 2000, with the commencement of jury selection. (R., 
p.l561.) On October 26, 2000, the state filed a motion to amend the Indictment, 
requesting to change the date the defendant committed count IV (R., pp. 1 722-24), which 
the trial court granted (R., pp.174l-48). Evidence presentation commenced on October 
30, 2000 (R., p.l760), which included a view of the scene of the murders and fire (R., 
pp.1790-91). The trial was completed on December 22, 2000, with the jury returning 
guilty verdicts on all counts. (R., pp.2223-31.) 
After a plethora of post-trial motions, sentencing commenced on August 27, 2001 
(R., p.2829), with the presentation of evidence being completed on September 7, 2001 
(R., pp.2884-90). On October 25, 200 I, the district court read its Findings of the Court in 
Considering Death Penalty. (R., pp.3082-31 19.) As to Donna's murder, the court found 
the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt two statutory aggravating factors, 
including, at the time murder was committed the defendant also committed another 
murder, I.C. § 19-2515(h)(2), and the murder was committed against a witness or 
potential witness in a criminal or civil proceeding because of such proceeding, I.C. § 19-
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2515(h)(10). (R., ppJ094-3100.) As to Fred's murder, the district court found beyond a 
reasonable doubt one statutory aggravating factor, at the time murder was committed the 
defendant also committed another murder, I.C. § 19-2515(h)(2). (R., pp.31 I 1-15.) After 
weighing all the mitigating factors against the individual statutory aggravating factors, 
the court concluded the mitigating factors were not sufficiently compelling to render the 
death penalty unjust and sentenced Shackelford to death for both first -degree murders. 
(R., pp.3100, 3115.) Shackelford was also given prison sentences for the other felony 
offenses. (R., pp.3120-27.) Judgment was filed November 1,2001. (R., pp.3120-27.) 
For purposes of pursuing post-conviction remedies, an order was filed appointing 
the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"). (R., ppJ128-29.) Shackelford filed a 
Notice of Appeal on December 4, 2001. (R., pp.3168-73.) Another order appointing the 
SAPD to represent Shackelford on appeal was also filed. (R., pp.3177-81.) 
Shackelford filed his initial Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on December 6, 
2001. (UP CPA, R., pp.1O-35.) The state's timely answer was filed January 4, 2002. 
(UPCPA, R., pp.87-93.) Shackelford was permitted to amend his petition numerous 
times, including the Revised Second Amended Petition, with multiple attachments, being 
filed November 3, 2003. (UpePA, R., pp.756-1196.) The state filed an answer (UPCPA, 
R., pp.1387-1416) and Motion to Dismiss (UPCPA, R., pp.1458-59). On September 9, 
2004, Shackelford filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition. (UPCPA, R., 
pp.l787-1828.) Shackelford's response to the state's motion was filed October 18,2004 
(UPCPA, R., pp.l857-1906), which included an Index of Attachments with numerous 
attachments some of which were ordered sealed by the district court (UPCP A, R., 
pp.1907-2463). 
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Despite the parties' pending motions, on November 4, 2004, Shackelford moved 
to file another amended petition (UPCPA, R., pp.2524-33), which the district court 
granted (UPCPA, R., pp.2947, 3435-37). Shackelford's third amended petition (UPCPA, 
R., pp.2534-2642) also included an Index of Attachments (UPCPA, R., pp.2643-44). The 
state filed an answer. (UPCPA, R., pp.3057-61.) 
On November 19, 2004, pursuant to the court's order, Shackelford filed an 
addendum to his third amended petition. (UPCPA, R., pp.2980-90.) On February 9, 
2005, Shackelford moved to file a second addendum to his third amended petition 
(UPCPA, R., pp.3175-82), which the district court denied (UPCPA, R., pp.3428-41). 
In two different decisions, the district court addressed the parties' motions for 
summary disposition on April 8, 2005. In the first decision, the district court granted 
Shackelford sentencing relief concluding Ring mandated the jury conduct the weighing 
process and, therefore, ordering that Shackelford's death sentences be "set aside." 
(UPCPA, R., pp.3580-84.) The district court rejected Shackelford's other Ring claim, 
concluding the jury's verdict established he murdered Domla and Fred at the same 
location and date thereby establishing the multiple-murder aggravator. (UPCP A, R., 
p.3579.) Based upon the decision to provide Shackelford sentencing relief, the district 
court concluded three other claims were moot. (UPCPA, R., pp.3628-29.) All of 
Shackelford's remaining claims were denied. (UPCPA, R., pp.3569-3631.) 
Shackelford's Notice of Appeal (UPCPA, R., pp.3702-05), and the state's Notice 
of Cross-Appeal were timely filed on May 20, 2005 (UPCPA, R., pp.3706-09). 
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ISSUES 
Shackelford has phrased the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING, 
DURING THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF, MULTIPLE HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS OF DONNA FONTAINE TO REBUT THE 
POSSIBILITY OF SUICIDE WHERE THE STATE, NOT 
SHACKELFORD, INJECTED THE ISSUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 
SUICIDE INTO THE CASE? [sic] 
II. WHETHER THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF SONJA AND MARY ABITZ.? [sic] 
III. WHETHER THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO 
GIVE THE JURY A HOLDER INSTRUCTION LIMITING THE 
EFFECT OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE? [sic] 
IV. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH LESSENED 
THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF AND PERMITTED A LESS 
THAN UNANIMOUS VERDICT? [sic] 
V. WHETHER THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY 
DISMISSING SHACKELFORD'S BRADY AND GIGLIO CLAIMS? 
[sic] 
VI. WHETHER THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY 
DISMISSING SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM OF DEPRIVATION OF HIS 
RlGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE? [sic] 
VII. WHETHER THE DISTRlCT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARlLY 
DISMISSING SHACKLEFORD'S [sic) CLAIM OF DEPRlVATION OF 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO LACK OF 
QUALIFICATIONS? [sic] 
VIII. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM THAT HIS TRlAL COUNSEL WERE 
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO ADEQUATELY IMPEACH STATE'S 
WITNESSES? [sic] 
IX. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARlL Y 
DISMISSING SHACKELFORD'S CLAIM THAT HIS COUNSEL 
WERE INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE 
DEFENSE EXPERT WITNESSES? [sic] 
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x. CUMULATIVE ERROR[.) 
(Brief, pp.lO-ll.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Because the admission of Donna's statements regarding her fear of Shackelford 
were relevant to rebut his contention that she committed suicide, which was 
perpetuated by Shackelford when the first officer arrived at the fire scene and at 
least two additional times during the investigation, has Shackelford failed to 
establish the district court abused its discretion by admitting the statements 
pursuant to I.R.E. 803(3)? 
2. Because of his failure to support his constitutional challenges to Donna's 
statements with authority and argument, has Shackelford waived those claims? 
3. Because Sonja's statements are statements of a co-conspirator, has Shackelford 
failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by admitting her 
statements pursuant to LR.E. 801(d)(2)(E)? 
4. Based upon the totality of the circumstances and because they were not offered 
for the truth, has Shackelford failed to establish Mary's statements and the 
prosecutor's question were testimonial and admitted in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause? 
5. Because the state's case was not based entirely upon circumstantial evidence, has 
Shackelford failed to establish the district court erred by denying his request for a 
Holder instruction? 
Alternatively, 
Because the denial of a Holder instruction does not reduce the "quantum of 
evidence required to convict," has Shackelford failed ... io. establish. the district 
court's refusal to give a Holder instruction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause? 
6. Reading the instructions as a whole, has Shackelford failed to establish his 
constitutional rights were violated based upon the jury instructions given by the 
district court? 
7. Because the state did not have a duty to disclose "peer review notes" by Dr. 
Howard, who was not part of the prosecution team, and even if the notes had been 
provided there is not a reasonable probability of a different verdict, does 
Shackelford's claim that the state withheld exculpatory evidence fail? 
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8. Because the $5,000,00 seized by the state at the time of his arrest would not have 
been sufficient to retain private counsel when the cost of his defense was in 
excess of $500,000.00 through sentencing, has Shackelford failed to establish he 
was denied his choice of counsel? 
9. Because merely being on a list of qualified attorneys or having sufficient 
qualifications alone do establish effective assistance of counsel, does 
Shackelford's claim regarding Barker not being on the I.C.R. 44.3 roster or being 
otherwise unqualified fail? 
lO. Because the questioning of witnesses is a trial strategy and Shackelford has failed 
to establish a reasonable probability the verdicts would have been different, do 
Shackelford's claims regarding inadequate impeachment of state witnesses fail? 
11. Has Shackelford failed to establish counsels' preparation of defense experts was 
objectively unreasonable and that further preparation would have changed the 
outcome of his trial? 
12. Based upon Shackelford's failure to demonstrate any error, does his claim of 
cumulative error fail? 
13. Because Ring v. Arizona does not mandate the jury find mitigating evidence and 
determine whether the totality of the mitigating evidence is sufficiently 
compelling to make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, did the district 
court err by granting Shackelford post-conviction sentencing relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Admitting Donna's 
Statements Of Fear To Rebut His Contention That She Committed Suicide 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford contends the district court erred by admitting testimony, pursuant to 
LR.E. 803(3), from several individuals regarding statements Donna made about her fear 
of Shackelford and her belief he would kill her. (Brief, pp.ll-24.) Specifically, 
Shackelford contends, because he allegedly did not attempt to present evidence of the 
possibility of suicide at trial, the evidence was not relevant and, even if relevant, was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Brief, pp.ll-23.) Shackelford further 
contends admission of the evidence violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses, 
to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Idaho's 
Constitution. (Brief, pp.23-24.) 
Shackelford's claims fail because the evidence regarding Donna's fear of him was 
properly admitted under LR.E. 803(3) to rebut his contention that she committed suicide, 
which he initially perpetuated when the first officer arrived at the fire scene and at least 
two additional times during the investigation. Because Shackelford has failed to support 
his federal or state constitutional claims with argument or authority, they have been 
waived. Finally, even if admission of the evidence was error, it was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The admissibility of evidence involves a mixed standard of review. State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, ---, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008). Questions of relevancy are 
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reviewed de novo. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 794, 932 P.2d 907 (1997). Whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 
667, 670, 978 P.2d 227 (1999), requiring review of the familiar three-part test: "(1) 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho, 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) 
C. Facts Regarding Shackelford's Statements About Donna Committing Suicide And 
Her Statements Of Fear 
Deputy Skiles was the first law enforcement officer to arrive at the fire. (Tr., 
p.388.) Upon arrival, Deputy Skiles identified Ted, Gary, Brian, Mary and Shackelford. 
(Tr., pp.391-92.) Deputy Skiles questioned Ted who suggested the possibility Donna 
might be in the fire as a result of suicide, which was based upon "things that were 
common knowledge." (Tr., pp.1l47-48.) Deputy Skiles then advised Shackelford of 
Ted's statements and Shackelford "asked me not to talk about that too loud." (Tr., 
p.392.) When asked, "what he thought the chances of there actually being a possible 
suicide in the fire," Shackelford responded, "it could be good, but he didn't want to say 
because he didn't know for sure." (Tr., p.395.) Shackelford also claimed when he and 
Donna were together she talked about suicide. (Tr., p.396.) Based upon this information, 
Deputy Skiles contacted dispatch to have an on-call detective sent "because there was a 
possibility there could be a suicide victim in the fire." (Tr., pp.402-03.) 
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Deputy Kurtis Hall was the on-call detective that responded. (Tr., pp.528-29.) 
After examining the scene, Deputy Hall took five individuals, including the defendant, to 
the Abitz's residence. (Tr., pp.534-35.) Deputy Hall interviewed Shackelford who said 
he thought Donna was in the fire. (Tr., p.S38.) Shackelford then asked him to step 
outside after which Shackelford further discussed his belief Donna committed suicide: 
Donna had -- had a bad time recently that she had had an election go 
against her, that she was up on fraud charges in Missouri that he had 
raised for the forgery of a check and that -- r can't repeat the same words, 
but it was something along the lines of, things are crumbling around her 
right now, she's having a hard time. 
(Tr., p.541.) Additionally, Shackelford said, "it was possible that Donna committed 
suicide," but failed to "specifically say" why. (Tr., p.542.) 
During cross-examination, when Deputy Hall was asked if he had been "informed 
that this was a fire, possible suicide," he responded, "Yes." .(Tr., pp.664-65.) Deputy 
Hall was asked, "When investigating a suicide, is it typical to not find items that don't 
belong there." (Tr., p.728.) On redirect, Deputy Hall further discussed his preliminary 
investigation and explained, "The evidence because of what had been told to me 
suggested we had a suicide." (Tr., p.750.) 
Shackelford's statements regarding Donna's death being the result of a suicide 
were not limited to Idaho law enforcement officers. On June 1, 1999, just three days 
after the murders, Brian Young, Deputy Sheriff in Iron County, Missouri, was advised by 
dispatch that Shackelford called him "due to an emergency." (Tr., pp.1643-44.) When 
Deputy Young returned the call, Shackelford asked him ifhe had spoken with Donna and 
whether he had heard "she had been suicidal." (Tr., p.1645.) When Deputy Young asked 
the nature of the emergency, Shackelford responded, "I believe Donna's dead." (Tr., 
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p.1646.) Shackelford further stated, "he thought it could have been a suicide, that she 
may have been depressed from me filing charges against her and been suicidal that that 
could be what happened if that was indeed her." (Tr., p.1748.) 
To rebut Shackelford's contention that Donna committed suicide and to explain 
the nature of law enforcement's investigation as a result of his statements, the state 
sought admission of statements Donna made to various individuals regarding her fear of 
Shackelford. Shackelford filed a motion to suppress Donna's statements of fear (R., 
pp.587-89), which the state asserted established her "state of mind" and were admissible 
under I.R.E. 803(3) CR., pp.799-809). Because neither party had provided a proffer 
regarding the evidence, the district court initially explained, "To the extent that door is 
opened, I think I would have to revisit 803(3) at that time." (Pretrial Tr., p.483.) 
The state filed a Motion in Limine reasserting Donna's statements were evidence 
of her mental state and relevant to rebut Shackelford's investigatory statements regarding 
his belief she committed suicide. (R., p.1245.) After hearing the state's proffer regarding 
how the issue of suicide arose during the investigation, the district court reasoned, "To 
the extent that suicide is raised as an issue, the State will be allowed to introduce 
evidence of Donna Shackelford's expressed fear relative to Dale Shackelford." (pretrial 
Tr., pp.953-54.) The court further explained that Shackelford's "making statements that 
it was suicide or that it was likely suicide at the scene," would be admissible because he 
is a party opponent. (Pretrial Tr., p.954.) However, without hearing the evidence, the 
court concluded it could not make a determinative ruling, "But I think [the state's] very 
close to being able to make it." (Pretrial Tr., p.954.) 
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After Deputies Skiles and Hall testified at trial, the state renewed its request to 
present Donna's statements expressing her fear of Shackelford. (Tr., pp.845-48.) After 
hearing additional arguments, the district court concluded: 
Then I do think that the victim's mental state is now at issue. I do 
think that this jury has heard testimony that the defendant on the night of 
the deaths of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahnuik was injecting the 
possibility of suicide. And I do think her mental status thus becomes 
relevant under 803(3). And I will allow statements of Donna Fontaine to 
be admitted relative to her fear of Dale Shackelford. 
(Tr., p.849.) 
Based upon the court's ruling, the state presented several witnesses who testified 
regarding Donna's fear of Shackelford. Phillip Wadlow explained that during a 
conversation approximately a year before the murders, Donna said, "She was afraid" of 
Shackelford. (Tr., pp.869-70.) During a conversation later that year, Donna was "very 
upset and made statements that she was -- she was afraid. And ... she thought that she 
" 
was going to have to just leave, change her name and nobody know where she was at. 
She was afraid." (Tr., pp.875, 877.) 
Melinda Wadlow, Phillip's wife, discussed a conversation in April 1999, when 
Donna said, "she was afraid of Dale," "she was going to be hurt by Dale" and "there 
wasn't a week that went by that she wasn't over where she was -- where she feared Dale 
because of the phone calls." (Tr., pp.946-47.) 
Donald Boyle testified regarding a March 1999 conversation in which Donna was 
"very upset. She was worried. She was scared. . .. She was scared that -- that Mr. 
Shackelford was going to kill her. ... she was afraid that if he [sic] she didn't drop the 
charges that this man would kill her." (Tr., pp.l233-37.) 
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In January 1999, Brian Raymond met with Donna who explained she was "having 
a lot of problems with Dale and that she was very, very scared." (Tr., pp.l075, 77.) 
Donna saw Donald Watkins in July 1997, during which her mental state was 
"very, very poor. She was crying and was having a very hard time." (Tr., p.2005.) 
Approximately three days later, Donna spoke with Watkins over the telephone and said 
she was "scared of Mr. Shackelford." (Tr., pp.2006-07.) During a camping trip over 
Labor Day weekend that year, Donna expressed her fear of Shackelford, stating, "he was 
going to kill her." (Tr., p.2037.) 
Finally, in 1998 and the early months of 1999, Donna expressed her fears to 
Suzanne, stating, "She was afraid that [Shackelford] was going to kill her." (Tr., p.2139.) 
D. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Admitting 
Donna's Statements Of Fear 
The district court admitted Donna's statements pursuant to LRE. 803(3), which 
reads as follows: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness. 
(3) A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, 
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, 
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed 
unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of 
declarant's will. 
While Shackelford relies upon three cases predating the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
the analysis for the "state of mind" exception is virtually identical, "except, perhaps, with 
respect to statements of memory." Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 301, 900 P.2d 
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201 (Ct. App. 1995). In State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727,731,471 P.2d 582 (1970), the 
court examined the victim's statement, "I'm scared to death of him, not so bad when he's 
drinking beer, but when he's drinking whiskey he's crazier than a tick," and concluded it 
was admissible to demonstrate, "the mental state of the victim and ill-feeling or hostility 
between decedent and defendant." While the rationale in Radabaugh was reaffirmed in 
State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 478-79,546 P.2d 1180 (1976), the conviction in Garcia 
was reversed because the trial court failed to give a limiting instruction? 
In State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 381, 630 P.2d 665 (1981), the court concluded, 
"In almost all cases, statements made by a murder victim to a third party prior to the fatal 
incident are held to be inadmissible as hearsay." However, the court did not retreat from 
Radabaugh or Goodrich, explaining, "statements of a murder victim will be admitted only 
after a determination that the declaration is relevant, and that the need for and value of 
such testimony outweighs the possibility of prejudice to the accused." Garcia, at 382. 
Relying upon Goodrich, the court concluded, "four rather well defined categories have 
developed in which the relevancy of such statements may overcome the possible 
prejudice of admitting hearsay testimony," including: "(a) when the defendant claims 
self-defense as justification for the killing, ... (b) when the defendant seeks to build his 
defense around the fact that the deceased committed suicide, ... (c) when the defendant 
claims the killing was accidental, ... [and) (d) when a specific 'mens rea' is in issue, e.g. 
was the killing premeditated or not?" Id. at 382. Reviewing the specific statement, 
2 In State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 128, 714 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of 
appeals addressed the evidence presented of the victim's state of mind and concluded the 
district court "committed no error ... by failing to give the jury a limiting instruction." 
Therefore, to the extent Shackelford is contending the district court erred by failing to 
give a limiting instruction, his claim fails. Additionally, as explained below, even if such 
an instruction was required, it was harmless error. 
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"Look how nice the lady is, she even sent me mejorales," id. at 381, the court reasoned it 
did not fall within any of the four purposes for admission. rd. at 382. 
In State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 794, 932 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of 
appeals reaffirmed, "A victim's fear of an individual is relevant in only limited 
circumstances." The court further explained: 
Purposes for which such statements are relevant include: establishment of 
a motive for the crime charged, rebuttal of a claim of self-defense, suicide, 
or accidental death by illustrating the victim's propensity for or away from 
the relevant tendencies, or to dispel the argument that victim and the 
accused had a good relationship. In each instance, the state of mind of the 
victim was integral in understanding a significant issue in the case. 
Id. at 794-95 (internal citations omitted). 
Donna's statements were clearly admissible to rebut Shackelford's contention that 
she committed suicide, which was perpetuated by him during the course of the 
investigation. It was Shackelford's statements that drove the initial investigation causing 
Deputy Skiles to contact the on-call detective, "because there was a possibility there 
could be a suicide victim in the fire." (Tr., pp.402-03.) Shackelford's statements to 
Deputies Skiles and Hall were clearly admissible as statements against interest and 
relevant to establish Shackelford's belief that Donna's body was in the fire even though 
he contended it was there based upon her allegedly killing herself. Even more 
compelling was Shackelford's conversation with Deputy Young just three days after the 
murders. The state was certainly permitted to rebut Shackelford's statements of Donna's 
alleged suicide irrespective of whether he first raised the specter of suicide or some other 
individual raised it and perpetuated that individual's assessment. Shackelford was not 
required to agree with Ted's initial statement to Skiles that Donna may have committed 
suicide, but once he did, her statements of fear regarding Shackelford were admissible 
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under the state of mind exception to rebut the contention she committed suicide, which 
Shackelford perpetuated. 
Shackelford contends, because his "defense has consistently been simply that it 
was not Shackelford who committed the crime," LR.E. 803(3) is inapposite. (Brief, 
p.22.) Merely because Shackelford presented notice of an alibi defense (R., pp.78-80) 
and asserted at trial he did not "commit the crime," does not mean the state was 
prevented from presenting evidence surrounding Donna's fear. Obviously, if Donna had 
committed suicide his defense was still viable; he was not the one who committed the 
killing. In other words, in a case in which the defendant claimed the victim committed 
suicide, he would also be contending he did not commit the murder. Moreover, 
Shackelford waived his opening argument. (R., p.162.) Therefore, the state had no way 
of definitively knowing what defense he would actually present, particularly based upon 
his prior statements of Donna's suicide . 
. Nor was the state required to wait until Shackelford presented his defense. The 
district court has "broad discretion in making the initial determination to admit or reject 
rebuttal evidence." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127 (1997). As 
explained in State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 282, 647 P.2d 734 (1982), "Even where 
evidence admitted in rebuttal is not strictly rebuttal in nature, its admission or exclusion 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. provided that the party against whom such 
evidence is admitted has the opportunity to meet the evidence." In Porter, 130 Idaho at 
785, this same principle was applied in the reverse to a claim that the state improperly 
called a witness to testify in its case-in-chief merely to impeach a third party's 
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confession. While this may have "disadvantaged Porter in the presentation of his proof," 
the court determined there was no undue prejudice. rd. 
Further, when Shackelford cross-examined Deputy Hal! he asked whether Deputy 
Hall had been informed the fire involved a possible suicide (Tr., pp.664-65) and what 
was typically found when investigating a suicide (Tr., p.728). By asking such questions 
during the state's case-in-chief, Shackelford further opened the door for the evidence of 
Donna's fears to be presented during the state's case-in-chief. See In re Martin, 931 
So.2d 759, 766 (AI. 2004) (the defendant's opening statement, which "suggested" the 
victim "might have committed suicide," put the victim's state of mind at issue); State v. 
Dehaney, 803 A.2d 267, 276-77 (Conn. 2002) (victim's statement, "I fear for the safety 
of the lives of men [and] my children," was properly admitted during state's case-in-
chief); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 615 (Del. 2001) (evidence of victim's state of 
mind relevant in state's case-in-chief to establish defendant was a "spurned lover, 
therefore had a motive to kill her"). 
As explained in Hodges v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 680, 690 (Va. 2006) 
(emphasis added), "The key to the admissibility of evidence showing a victim's state of 
mind is thus its relevance to a material issue in the case. Relevance exists when the 
evidence has a 'logical tendency, however slight to prove a fact at issue in a case. '" 
Idaho's relevance definition is even broader. "Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Whether a fact is 
material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." 
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at ---, 191 P.3d at 221 (internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Based upon Shackelford's perpetuation of Ted's initial statement, Donna's state 
of mind not only was relevant, but "was integral in understanding a significant issue in 
the case." Gray, 129 Idaho at 795. 
E. Shackelford's Constitutional Arguments Have Been Waived 
In conclusory fashion, Shackelford also contends the admission of testimony 
regarding Donna's fears denied him the right to confront witnesses, a fair trial and due 
process in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Brief, pp.23-24.) 
However, because Shackelford has failed to support his claims with authority and 
argument, they are waived. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170 (1999) 
(citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966 (1996»; State v. Creech, 132 
Idaho 1, 19,966 P.2d 1 (1998). 
Additionally, because Shackelford has failed to argue for a different interpretation 
of the Idaho Constitution and support his argument with authority, that issue has also 
been waived. State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho lO9, 111-12, 952 P.2d. 1245 (1998); Porter, 130 
Idaho at 791. Therefore, the only issue properly before this Court is whether the 
admission of statements regarding Donna's fear of Shackelford violated Idaho 
e0identiary rules. 
F. Any Alleged Error From The Introduction Of Donna's Statements Of Fear Was 
Harmless 
The standard for determining whether error is harmless is "whether it appears, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the error 
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contributed to [Shackelford's] conviction." State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 895, 980 
P.2d 552 (1999). "An appellant has the burden to show prejudicial error, and absent such 
a showing, error will be deemed harmless." State v. Rodriguez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 
P .2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983). Evidence improperly admitted pursuant to LR.E 803(3) is 
subject to harmless error analysis. Trevino, 132 Idaho at 895. In Garci[l, 102 Idaho at 
383, the court recognized the improperly admitted evidence was "overshadowed by the 
appellant's own inculpatory admission," resulting in the evidence being "offset by the 
admission to the point where it becomes harmless." 
Shackelford's case was also built upon statements he made and the testimony of 
his co-conspirators. For example, in the summer of 1997, when his marriage to Donna 
was "falling apart," Shackelford told James Avery, "I don't know what I'm going to do 
with Donna if r catch her with another man maybe I should just kill them both." (Tr., 
pp.277-78,280.) 
That same year, Shackelford told Ninichuck, "Donna was an ugly person and that 
he was going to destroy her. He was going to destroy her financially, he was going to 
destroy her professionally. That he was going to destroy her relationships with every 
friend and every family member." (Tr., p.2118.) Shackelford continued to rant, stating, 
"she knew that was the worst thing that anybody could do to him was abandon him. And 
that she deserved - she deserved to die." (Tr., pp.2118-19.) Eventually, Shackelford 
said, "he loved her very much, ... but he couldn't live with her" and "he was going to 
kill her." (Tr., p.1119.) On another occasion, Shackelford reiterated his desire to kill 
Donna. (Tr., pp.2126-27.) Three weeks later Shackelford again stated he "passionately 
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loved [Donna] and - but he couldn't live with her" and that "he could kill her and make it 
look like an accident." (Tr., pp.2127-29.) 
Based upon his own statements expressing his desire to kill Donna, the testimony 
of his co-conspirators and the forensic evidence, Shackelford has failed to establish a 
reasonable possibility that the alleged error associated with the admission of testimony 
regarding Donna's fear contributed to his conviction. 
II. 
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion Or 
Otherwise Committed Constitutional Error By Admitting The Out Of Court Statements 
Of Sonja And Abitz, And The Prosecutor's Out Of Court Ouestions 
A. Introduction 
Without citation to any authority, Shackelford initially contends Sonja Abitz's 
statement to Dorothy Cox was erroneously admitted as a co-conspirator's statement 
because "the conspiracy had not been formed" and it was "not made in furtherance of the 
conspiracy." (Brief, pp.24-25.) Shackelford further contends Mary Abitz's statement 
during a telephone call to Shackelford, which was heard by Deputy Earl Aston and 
prosecutor Robin Eckmann, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. (Brief, 
pp.25-26.) Finally, Shackelford contends Eckmann's questions to Mary during the 
telephone call also violated his right to confrontation. (Brief, p.26.) 
Because Shackelford failed to support his argument regarding Sonja's statement 
with citation to authority, this Court is barred from addressing the issue. Even if the 
Court addresses the issue, Shackelford has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion by admitting Sonja's statement. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
Shackelford has failed to establish Mary's statement was testimonial, particularly because 
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the statement was not offered for the truth. Because Shackelford is raising his claim 
regarding Eckmann's question to Mary for the first time on appeal, this Court is barred 
from addressing the claim's merits. Further, because Eckmann's question was not 
offered for the truth, it was not hearsay and, therefore, did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause. Finally, any error as a result of the three statements was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Questions of admissibility of evidence are generally reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 264; State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 
3 (1997); State v. MacDonald, 131 Idaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). This 
standard has been specifically applied to statements of co-conspirators, State v. Harris, 
141 Idaho 721, 724,117 P.3d 135 (Ct. App. 2005), and hearsay, Jeremiah v. Yankee 
Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 246, 953 P.2d 992 (1998). 
C. Sonja Abitz's Statement To Dorothy Cox 
1. Facts Regarding Sonja's Statement 
Sonja worked for Dorothy Cox as a school bus driver. (Tr., p.2584.) During the 
spring of 1999, prior to the two murders, Sonja had a conversation with Cox regarding 
Donna and stated, "we're going to bum her house down." (Tr., p.2589.) Prior to trial, 
the state filed a Motion in Limine seeking admission of Sonja's statement to Cox. (R., 
pp.1230-34.) After reviewing the grand jury transcript, the district court concluded the 
statement was admissible under I.R.E 801 (d)(2)(E) as a co-conspirator's statement and it 
would be admitted because "there is some evidence of the existence of a conspiracy as 
made through the offer of proof by the State and through my review of the grand jury 
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transcript." (Pretrial Tr., p.807.) Sonja did not testify at Shackelford's trial and the 
statement was admitted through Cox. 
2. Shackelford's Claim Regarding Sonja's Statement Has Been Waived 
Without citation to l.R.E 801(d)(2)(E) or any other authority, Shackelford 
contends Sonja's statement was not admissible because "the conspiracy had not been 
formed" and it was "not made in furtherance of the conspiracy." (Brief, pp.24-25.) 
Because Shackelford has failed to support his claim with authority and argument, it is 
waived. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511; Creech, 132 Idaho at 19. 
3. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion 
Should this Court conclude the claim is not barred, it still fails. The district court 
admitted Sonja's statement pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E), which reads as follows: "A 
statement is not hearsay if - ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a 
statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy." For such statements to be admissible, "it is not necessary that the statements 
were made in the presence of, or with the knowledge of, the other conspirators." State v. 
Hoffmm1 123 Idaho 638, 642, 851 P2d 934 (1993). "Nor is it necessary that the 
defendant be a part of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made." rd. Rather, 
"[aJ trial court can properly admit evidence of statements made in pursuance of a 
conspiracy if there is some evidence of the conspiracy or a sufficient offer of proof of its 
existence." rd. As explained in State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 485, 873 P.2d 122 (1994), 
"Idaho law simply requires that there be some evidence of conspiracy or promise of its 
production." The appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's decision to admit such 
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testimony if there is "sufficient evidence to permit the trial court reasonably to infer that 
there existed a conspiracy." ld. (quoting Hoffman, 123 Idaho at 642). 
Shackelford contends because the indictment alleges the conspiracy took place 
between May 25-29, 1999, Sonja's statement was inadmissible. However, the indictment 
alleged only three overt acts that occurred between May 25-29, 1999; it did not allege this 
was the "beginning" of the conspiracy. Shackelford's argument was expressly rejected in 
State v. Ingram, 138 Idaho 768, 771, 69 PJd 188 (Ct. App. 2003). "The State need show 
only that the proffered out-of-court statements were made during the course and in the 
furtherance of a conspiracy that existed when the statements were made." rd. 
Shackelford next contends the statement, "we're going to burn her house down," 
was not admissible because, "on [its] face," it was not made in furtherance of the 
conspiracy 3 (Brief, p.25.) However, the state simply fails to understand how this 
statement does not indicate, "on its face," that there is an ongoing conspiracy to bum 
down Donna's home and no explanation has been provided by Shackelford. In 
Garlington v. O'Leary, 879 F.2d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1989), the court addressed the similar 
statement, "(w]e're going to take care of him," and concluded, "[a] reasonable basis does 
exist for concluding that ML Key's statement furthered the objectives of the conspiracy." 
See also LaGrenade v. Gordon, 299 S.E.2d 809, 814 (Ct. App. N.C. 1983) (statement, 
3 Shackelford makes the same argument with respect to Sonya's statements that she did 
not like Donna and that Sonja referred to Donna as "the bitch." (Tr., p.24.) However, 
while there was an objection at trial to these two statements, it was based upon 
foundation, not hearsay. Because there was not a hearsay objection, any claim regarding 
the same is now waived. State v. Teasley, 138 Idaho 113, 117, 58 PJd 97 (Ct. App. 
2002) ("Objecting to the admission of evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate 
and different basis for exclusion of the evidence"). 
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"we're going to keep the baby - and you just go out there," was admissible as co-
conspirator statement)4 
Because Shackelford has failed to establish or even allege tile actual conspiracy 
had not commenced when the statement was made, and the statement was made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, he has failed to establish ilie district court abused its 
discretion. 
4. Any Alleged Error From Sonya's Statement Was Harmless 
The standard for harmless error detailed above has been applied to the erroneous 
admission of co-conspirator statements. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 363, 972 P.2d 737 
(Ct. App. 1998). As in Pecor, Sonya's statement to Cox "was merely repetitive of [other] 
evidence at tria!." rd. Judy Foster, testified iliat on ilie day of the murders, while at the 
Locust Blossom festival, Sonya said she "wised that [DoI111a) would just leave, that her 
house would just burn down and she would go back to Missouri." (Ir., p.2605.) In light 
of this statement and all the oilier evidence presented at trial, Sonya's statement to Cox 
was de minimus. 
D. Mary Abitz's Statements Regarding A Tape 
1. Facts Regarding Mary's Statements 
This claim involves a tape-recorded conversation involving Shackelford iliat was 
mailed to Mary. (Tr., pp.2703-04.) During an interview by Detective Earl Aston and 
4 To the extent Shackelford is contending ilie statement was made to a third party who 
was not involved in the conspiracy, his claim also fails. United States v. Colon-Diaz, 521 
F.3d 29,36 nJ (1" Cir. 2008) (it is immaterial that the oilier person in the conversation 
was not a co-conspirator); State v. Camacho, 924 A.2d 99, 119-20 (Conn. 2007); State v. 
Sanchez-Guillen, 145 PJd 406,410 eCt. App. Wash. 2006); Brooks v. State, 635 S.E.2d 
723,728 (Ga. 2006) (same); United States v. Davis, 457 FJd 817, 825 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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prosecutor Robin Eckmann with Shackelford on January 20, 2000, Shackelford received 
a telephone call from Mary, who was apparently asked by Eckmann about the tape while 
Shackelford was listening. (Ir., pp.2696-97, 2735-36.) Mary responded that Becky 
Boone had received the tape. (Ir., p.2736.) 
Ihis information was elicited at trial from Detective Aston. Based upon the Sixth 
Amendment, Shackelford objected to statements Mary made during the conversation. 
(Ir., p.2728.) The state responded that Mary's statements that she received the tape were 
"not offered for the truth," but were actually offered to prove a "false statement" because 
Mary did not receive the tape. (Tr., pp.2728-30.) Ihe district court permitted the 
testimony as further evidence of the conspiracy, but then gave a limiting instruction 
explaining, "Mr. Aston is now going to recount some statements from Mary Abitz and, 
likewise, with those statements they are not being offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, but that the statement was made." (Ir., p.2735.)5 
2. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish A Confrontation Clause Violation 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." After Shackelford's trial, the Supreme Court abandoned its prior 
Confrontation Clause analysis from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 46 (1980), and concluded 
the Clause bars "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at 
5 Shackelford also contends statements made by Mary to Deputy Hall violated his 
confrontation rights. (Brief, pp.25-26.) Shackelford has failed to cite any statements 
made by Mary to Deputy Hall. While the state is aware of statements made by Mary to 
Deputy Hall, the only objection at trial was based upon hearsay, not the Confrontation 
Clause. (Tr., pp.2795-97.) Assuming this is the error complained of by Shackelford, 
because there was not a proper objection below, the claim is waived on appeal. 
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trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). The 
primary evil at which the Clause is aimed is the govermnent's gathering of ex parte 
evidence with the purpose of using that evidence later at trial. rd. at 50-52; State v. 
Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911 (2007). 
As explained by the Court, "It is the testimonial character of the statement that 
separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay 
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 821 (2006). While unwilling to produce an exhaustive list of all conceivable 
"testimonial statements" relating to police interrogation, the Court ultimately concluded, 
"They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. at 823. In 
further explaining "testimonial statements," the Court subsequently reasoned, 
"Statements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to 
physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by 
hearsay rules." Giles v. California, --- U.S. ---, ---, 128 S.Ct. 2678,2692-93 (2008). In 
Hooper, 145 Idaho at 145, the court emphasized the "totality of circumstances" that must 
be examined to determine whether a statement is testimonial. 
Considering the "totality of circumstances" and the primary evil the Confrontation 
Clause seeks to avoid - the government's gathering of ex parte evidence with the purpose 
of using that evidence later at trial - Mary's statements are not testimonial. Mary 
initiated the telephone call to Shackelford and apparently had no idea anyone else was 
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present. (Tr., pp.2727-28.) When Shackelford received the call, "He said there's 
somebody here that you might want to talk to or we might want to talk to her, something 
along that line. And he reached over and put it on speaker - speaker phone." (Tr., 
p.2728.) During tbe conversation, Eckmann "asked if she had received a tape or was 
going to be receiving a tape - if she knew she was going to be receiving a tape." (Tr., 
p.2736.) "Mary started explaining tbat she had or that Becky had received a tape. And I 
noticed that Mr. Shackelford, to me it appeared, that he was agitated, becoming agitated." 
(Tr., pp.2736-37.) While the Court concluded the term "interrogation" should be used in 
its "colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense," Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4, it is 
clear Mary's response was not given "to structured police questioning." Id. 
Shackelford has failed to meet his burden of establishing Mary's statement was 
testimonial. More importantly, because he was present, heard and actually responded to 
Mary's statement, there was no ex parte gathering of information tbat could be used at 
trial. Finally, because Mary's statement was not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, there was no Confrontation Clause violation. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 
("The Clause ... does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than 
establishing the trutb of tbe matter asserted"). As explained by tbe prosecutor, Mary's 
statements were not offered for the truth, but actually offered to establish they were not 
true and tbat she was further attempting to "cover-up" what had taken place. (Tr., 
pp.2729-30.) In State v. Araujo, 169 P.3d 1123, 1126 (Kan. 2007) (quoting Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 413 (1985» the court reiterated, "Historically, the United States 
Supreme Court has held tbat the Confrontation Clause does not apply when the evidence 
is 'not hearsay under traditional rules of evidence. '" In Araujo, the court discussed the 
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numerous courts that have concluded statements not offered for the truth do not violate 
the Confrontation Clause and further explained statements "offered only to explain the 
course of action of an investigating officer, have been held admissible as nonhearsay." 
169 P.3d at 1127. As explained in United States v. Jimenez, 513 FJd 62,81 (3 rd Cir. 
2008), "Nonhearsay use of evidence as a means of demonstrating a discrepancy does not 
implicate the Confrontation Clause." In Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 304, 900 
P.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted), the court concluded, "If the evidence is 
offered for purposes for which the truth or falsity of the statement is irrelevant, the 
hearsay rule does not apply. For that reason, an out-of-court statement offered to 
impeach a witness's credibility is not hearsay. In such circumstances it is not the truth of 
the statement that has evidentiary value, but rather its juxtaposition against the 
inconsistent testimony of the witness." See also State v. Roberts, 951 A.2d 803, 813-14 
(Maine 2008) (because the out of court statement was not offered for the truth and the 
trial court gave a limiting instruction, the statement did not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause); State v. Wiggins, 648 S.E.2d 865, 871 (N.C. 2007) (because the state 
specifically noted the statements were not offered for their truth and the trial court gave a 
limiting instruction, the statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause); United 
States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 177-78 (2nd Cir. 2005) (applying Street to conclude that 
non-hearsay statements do not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
Mary's statements were also offered to establish the nature of the investigation, 
i.e. what had happened to the tape, and Shackelford's reaction. "[TJestimony provided 
merely by way of background, or to explain simply why the Government commenced an 
investigation, is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, does not 
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violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights." United States v. Powers, 500 F.3d 500, 
508 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Statements offered for the purpose of 
showing what effect the statement had on the listener are not hearsay subject to the 
Confrontation Clause. United States v. Cruz-Diaz, 2008 WL 5250979, *6 (lst Cir. 2008). 
Because Shackelford has failed to meet his burden of establishing Mary's 
statement was testimonial, and also failed to establish the statement violated the 
Confrontation Clause because it was not offered for the truth, his claim fails. 
3. Any Alleged Error From Mary's Statement Was Harmless 
In Hooper, 145 Idaho at 146, the court recognized Idaho has historically applied 
the harmless error test detailed above to Confrontation Clause violations prior to 
Crawford. Recognizing other courts have applied the harmless error doctrine since 
Crawforg, the court concluded, "There is no reason to assume the harmless error test 
would not apply post-Crawford." rd. The court further examined several factors in 
determining whether the error is harmless, including the importance of the witnesses' 
testimony, whether it was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroborating or 
contradictory evidence, the extent of cross-examination permitted and the overall strength 
of the state's case. Id. Concluding the testimony admitted in Hooper was "essential," the 
court held the error was not harmless. Id. 
The evidence in Hooper is in stark contrast to Mary's statement. Clearly, it was 
not "essential;" Shackelford would have been convicted irrespective of the statement 
because at best it was merely used to establish Mary had lied about who received the 
tape. Shackelford was not convicted based upon this minor detail, but his pre-murder 
statements that he wanted to kill Donna, his inconsistent statements after the murders, the 
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forensic evidence and the testimony of his co-conspirators. In light of the de minimus 
nature of Mary's statement and all the other evidence presented at trial, if there was a 
constitutional violation by admitting the statement, it was harmless. 
E. Robin Eckmann's Statements To Mary 
As detailed above, after Mary called him, Shackelford put the call on "speaker 
phone," thereby permitting Deputy Aston and Eckmann to listen to the call. (Tr., 
p.2728.) Deputy Aston testified that during the call, the following colloquy took place: 
A. I'm not sure if it was me or Robin. I believe, it was Robin 
Eckmarm who had asked her about the tape. 
Q. Okay. And what - did Robin ask about which particular 
tape it was? 
A. I don't believe at first. I think she was just asked if she had 
received a tape or who was going to be receiving a tape - if she was going 
to be receiving a tape, I believe was the question. 
(Tr., p.2736.) 
Shackelford contends Eckmann's questions about "which particular tape it was" 
and "if she was going to be receiving a tape," are testimonial statements introduced in 
violation of the Confrontation Clause. (Brief, p.26.) Because the only objection made at 
the time was based upon inadmissible hearsay, this Court is barred from addressing 
Shackelford's claim regarding the Confrontation Clause. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 
580,21 PJd 895 (2001); State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54,60-,896 P.2d 962 (1995). 
Even if considered by this Court, Eckmaml' s "statements" were not offered for 
the truth but merely to provide context to Mary's answer. As explained in State v. Siegel, 
137 Idaho 538, 540-41, 50 P.3d 1033 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted), "It is well 
established that out-of-court statements are not barred by the hearsay rule when offered to 
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show their effect on the listener. Thus, statements offered only to provide context to a 
defendant's admissions are not hearsay." 
Even if construed as testimonial, Eckmann's "statements" were clearly harmless. 
III. 
If The State's Case Was Entirely Circumstantial, Which The State Denies, The District 
Court's Refusal To Give A Holder Instruction Did Not Violate The Ex Post Facto Clause 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford contends, because the state's case was allegedly based upon 
circumstantial evidence, he was entitled to a Holder instruction pursuant to State v. 
Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 132,594 P.2d 639 (1979). During the course of Shackelford's 
trial the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Holder and concluded Holder instructions should 
not be given. State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652 (2000). Therefore, 
Shackelford contends the district court's refusal to give a Holder instruction, based upon 
Humphreys, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and due process. (Brief, pp.26-32.) 
Because the state's case was not based entirely upon circumstantial evidence, but 
included Shackelford's pre-murder statements that he wanted to kill Donna and the 
testimony of his co-conspirators, the district court did not error by refusing to give an 
instruction under Holder. Further, elimination of Holder does not constitute an ex post 
facto violation because it did not alter the rules of evidence by permitting less testimony 
to obtain a conviction. Even if it was error to refuse the instruction, it was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Constitutional issues are questions of law subject to free review by this Court." 
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89,91,90 P.3d 314, 316 (2004). Likewise, whether there was 
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an ex post/acto violation is question oflaw subject to free review. State v. O'Neill, 118 
Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121 (1990). 
The question of whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction 
to the jury is a matter of discretion. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,32,951 P.2d 1249 
(1997); State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 P.2d 391 (1996). However, the 
question of whether the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly and 
adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over which 
this court exercises free review. Bush, 131 Idaho at 32; Zichko, 129 Idaho at 923. 
C. Facts Regarding Holder And The Jury Instructions 
Based upon Holder, 100 Idaho at 132, the following instruction must be given 
when the state's case is based entirely upon circumstantial evidence: 
You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the crime 
charged against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved 
circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is 
guilty· of the crime, but carmot be reconciled with any other rational 
conclusion and each fact which is essential to complete a set of 
circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other 
to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to 
the defendant's imlocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt. 
Shackelford committed the murders on May 29, 1999. (R., pp.l-4.) On July 20, 
2000, prior to the commencement of Shackelford's trial, the Idaho Supreme Court issued 
Humphreys, 134 Idaho at 663, expressly overruling Holder, by concluding, "once the jury 
has been properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard of proof, the defendant is 
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not entitled to an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence even when all the 
evidence is circumstantial." 
Despite the supreme court's overruling of Holder, Shackelford expressly 
requested the district court give the jury a Holder instruction, and contended failure to 
give the instruction and applying Humphreys retroactively would violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. (R., pp.2133-36.) Without deciding whether the state's case was based 
entirely upon circumstantial evidence warranting a Holder instruction, the district court 
denied Shackelford's request based upon Humphreys. (R., pp.5252-53.) 
D. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The Entirety Of The State's Case Was Based 
Upon Circumstantial Evidence 
Irrespective of whether the district court's refusal to give a Holder instruction was 
based upon Humphreys, because the state's case was not based entirely upon 
circumstantial evidence, a Holder instruction would not have been given. The supreme 
court has repeatedly explained a Holder instruction is to be given only when the state's 
case is based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. In State v. Moore, 126 Idaho 208, 
210,880 P.2d 238 (1994), the supreme court reaffirmed this basic tenet by explaining: 
In State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979), this Court held 
that it was error not to give this type of instruction where the State's case 
is based solely on circumstantial evidence. However, this Court has 
rejected the proposition that a Holder instruction is required in cases 
where the State's case does not wholly rely on circumstantial evidence. 
State v. Bingham, 124 Idaho 698, 700, 864 P.2d 144, 146 (1993); State v. 
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 182, 845 P.2d 1211, 1215 (1993). In this case, 
intent was the only element of the State's case not proven through direct 
evidence. As such, it was not error for the trial court to refuse the 
requested instruction. 
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In State v. Sundquist, 128 Idaho 780, 781, 918 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(citations and quotations omitted), the court of appeals discussed the difference between 
circumstantial and direct evidence: 
Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves one of the facts on 
which a party has the burden of proof in the case, by means of proving one 
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. Circumstantial 
evidence. produces no witnesses who saw the questioned circumstance 
occur. Direct evidence, by contrast, is the testimony of witnesses who, 
with their physical senses, perceived conduct constituting the offense, and 
whose testimony relates to what they thereby perceived. 
As further explained in Sundquist, "Direct evidence may be supplied by the 
defendant's own admissions," including "out-of-court statements." Id. Likewise, the 
testimony of co-conspirators can provide direct evidence. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 
489,873 P.2d 122 (1994). 
In Shackelford's case, his pre-murder statements to Avery, "I don't know what 
I'm going to do with Donna if I catch her with another man maybe I should just kill them 
both" (Tr., pp.277-78, 280), and Ninichuck that Donna "deserved to die" (Tr., pp.2118-
19) and "he was going to kill her" (Tr., p.1119), provided direct evidence of his intent, an 
obviously necessary element for first-degree murder. Direct evidence was also provided 
by the two co-conspirators who testified regarding the planning of the murder, Bernadette 
Lasater and Martha Miller. Irrespective of whether the two co-conspirators were 
"disreputable" or were allegedly "compensated with lenient outcomes in exchange for 
testifying against Shackelford" (Brief, p.32), they still provided direct evidence. 
Because the state's case was not based entirely upon circumstantial evidence, 
there was no error by failing to give a Holder instruction. 
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E. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Refusal To Give A 
Holder Instruction Violated The Ex Post Facto Clause 
The United States Constitution, article I, § 10, prohibits the enactment of ex post 
facto laws. As explained in State v. Byers, the United States Supreme Court has defined 
what constitutes an ex post facto law: 
lSI, every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was hmocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offense, in order to convict the offender. 
102 Idaho 159, 166,627 P.2d 788 (1981) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 
390 (1798». 
The Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence has focused upon the third 
category because such laws "implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." Lynce v. 
Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). However, Shackelford's claim is based upon the fourth category, Carmell v. 
Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000), and the contention that elimination of the Holder instruction 
"allowed the state to obtain a conviction using a lower quantum of proof than was 
required at the time of the commission of the crime." (Brief, pp.30-32.) 
In Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 517-18 (2000), the Court addressed a Texas 
statute requiring a victim's testimony to be corroborated to convict the offender, which 
existed at the time the defendant committed the offense, but was repealed prior to trial. 
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The Court concluded the repeal of the corroboration requirement "changed the quantum 
of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction; under the new law, petitioner could be (and 
was) convicted on the victim's testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence." Id. 
at 530. Recognizing the fourth category from Calder "resonated harmoniously with one 
of the principal interests that the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to serve, 
fundamental justice," the Court concluded, "A law reducing the quantum of evidence 
required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, to say, retrospectively eliminating 
an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense, or lowering 
the burden of proof." Id. at 531-32. 
However, Humphreys' elimination of the Holder instruction did not reduce the 
"quantum of evidence required to convict." Rather, the supreme court merely 
recognized, based upon multiple rulings from sister states, "that an additional jury 
instruction is not required in a circumstantial case, when the jury is properly instructed on 
the reasonable doubt burden of proof." Id., 134 Idaho at 661. This is an argument more 
consistent with procedure than substantive change. As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 
432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977) (intemal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added), the Ex 
Post Facto Clause generally does not apply to procedural matters: 
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the 
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in 
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. 
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal 
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the 
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not 
affect matters of substance. 
Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a 
procedural change is not ex post facto. 
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The Supreme Court has identified "two critical elements [that] must be present for 
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply 
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected 
by it." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (footnote omitted). However, "no ex 
post facto violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does not 
increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts 
necessary to establish guilt." Id. at 29 n.12. "Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and 
governmental restraint when the legislature increases pnnishment beyond what was 
prescribed when the crime was consummated." rd. at 29 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), narrowed 
what constitutes an ex post facto violation by overruling several prior cases. After the 
defendant was sentenced, the Texas legislature amended the remedy that was available 
when an unauthorized fine was imposed at sentencing. Under the law at the time the 
defendant was sentenced, if the law did not authorize the fine, the judgment and sentence 
were void and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 39. After Youngblood was 
sentenced, new legislation was enacted permitting the appellate court to merely refonn an 
improper verdict, thereby eliminating the new trial remedy. rd. at 40. The Supreme 
Court reiterated that procedural changes do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 
45. The Court reasoned, "While these cases do not explicitly define what they mean by 
the word 'procedural,' it is logical to think that the term refers to changes in the 
procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the 
substantive law of crimes." rd. at 45. The Court concluded the new statute "is a 
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procedural change that allows reformation of improper verdicts. It does not alter the 
definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, ... nor does it increase the 
punishment for which he is eligible." Id. at 44 (emphasis added). The Court explained 
that language from other cases discussing whether a procedural change may violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause if it deprived a defendant of "substantial protections" or infringed 
upon "substantial personal rights" had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 45. 
This analysis was adopted by the Texas Court of Appeals when the defendant 
raised an ex post facto claim based upon the elimination of a "circumstantial evidence 
charge" similar to Holder. Davidson v. State, 737 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
The court concluded the change "did not subject appellant to retroactive criminal 
prosecution and it did not create a potentially more onerous punishment." Id. 
In State v. Webb, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 331 (Ohio, 1994) (internal quotes, citations 
and brackets omitted), the court addressed the same issue and recognized, "Collins 
specifically noted that the Beazell definition omits the reference * * * to alterations in the 
legal rules of evidence. * * * This language was not intended to prohibit the application 
of new evidentiary rules in trial for crimes committed before the changes." 
Although Davidson and Webb were both decided prior to Carmell, the standard 
was not altered. The Supreme Court expressly explained: 
We do not mean to say that every rule that has an effect on whether 
a defendant can be convicted implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
Ordinary rules of evidence for example, do not violate the Clause .... 
[SJuch rules, by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, do not 
at all subvert the presumption of innocence, because they do not concern 
whether the admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the 
presumption. Therefore, to the extent one may consider changes to such 
laws as "unfair" or "unjust," they do not implicate the same kind of 
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unfairness implicated by changes in rules setting forth a sufficiency of the 
evidence standard. Moreover, while the principle of unfairness helps 
explain and shape the Clause's scope, it is not a doctrine unto itself, 
invalidating laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause by its own force. 
rd., 529 U.S. at 533 n.23. 
In Brown v. DorMire, 2007 WL 2434055, *5 (E.D. Mo. 2007), the court applied 
this standard, concluding that the elimination of a circumstantial evidence instruction that 
was deemed by the Missouri Supreme Court to be an incorrect statement of Missouri law, 
. "did not change the law to make something illegal that was previously legal, nor did it 
increase the penalty of an act that was previously illegal." See also State v. Woodworth, 
941 S.W.2d 679, 700 (Mo. 1997) ("the instruction incorrectly stated the law and 
functioned to confuse and mislead jurors"). 
Finally, in Reed v. Quarterman, 504 FJd 465, 483-84 (5 th Cir. 2007), the court 
exanlined the elimination of a circumstantial evidence instruction and reviewed the issue 
under Carmel!. Reviewing the Texas court's elimination of the instruction, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded, "not that the circumstantial evidence instruction had established a 
separate and distinct burden of proof, but rather that it confused the jury as to the proper 
burden." rd. at 484. Because the change did not effect a substantive change in the law, 
the Fifth Circuit concluded there was no ex post facto violation. Id. 
Despite several states having eliminated circumstantial evidence instructions, 
Shackelford has failed to cite a single case establishing an ex post facto violation based 
upon the elimination of the instruction. Rather, because the change is based upon 
procedure and not a substantive change in the law, the courts appear to have unanimously 
rejected this claim. Because Humphreys was not a substantive change, but merely a 
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correction clarifying the requirement that one standard of proof - beyond a reasonable 
doubt - be applied to all cases, there is no ex post facto violation. 
F. Any Alleged Error From A Holder Instruction Not Being Given Was Harmless 
"To constitute error entitling a defendant to relief, an instruction must mislead the 
jury or prejudice the defendant." State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155, 157, 139 P.3d 757 
(Ct. App. 2006). The error is harmless if the reviewing court concludes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error. State v. 
Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 300, 32 P.3d 685,692 (Ct. App. 2001). 
While Idaho has yet to examine whether the refusal of a Holder instruction can be 
harmless, several states have recognized, if such an instruction is required under state 
law, it can be reviewed for harmless error. Thompson v. State, 662 S.E.2d 124, 582 (Ga. 
2008) ("any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt"); State v. 
Keen, 31 S. W.3d 196, 218-19 (Term. 2000) (the error was harmless because "it does not 
appear to have affirmatively affected the outcome of the sentencing hearing"); State v. 
Needs, 508 S.E.2d 857, 867 (S.C. 1999) (error was harmless "because the trial judge 
instructed jurors twenty-six other times throughout his charge that the State has the 
burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
The fact that Shackelford has raised this claim in the context of an ex post fact 
violation does not change the analysis. At least one federal court has concluded, in at 
least limited areas, ex post facto violations are subject to harmless error analysis. 
Jermings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1251-53 (lIth Cir. 2007). The state also 
recognizes the Ninth Circuit has generally refused to conduct harmless error analysis 
involving ex postfacto violations concluding they carmot be categorized as either "trial-
43 
type" or "structural" errors. Williams v. Roe, 421 F.3d 883, 887-88 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). 
However, the Supreme Court recently rebuked the Ninth Circuit's analysis regarding 
"structural error," reaffinning the narrowness of the "structural error" doctrine based 
upon a series of Supreme Court decisions. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, --- U.S. ---, ---,129 S.Ct. 
530,532 (2008). Based upon those Supreme Court decisions, an alleged violation of the 
ex post/acto clause stemming from the district court's refusal to give a Holder instruction 
"no more vitiates all of the jury's findings than does omission or misstatement of an 
element of the offense when only one theory is submitted." HedgPeth, 129 S.Ct. at 532. 
Therefore, the alleged error is subject to harmless error analysis. 
Based upon the other instructions given by the district court defining reasonable 
doubt and that the burden was on the state to prove Shackelford's guilt, and the 
overwhelming nature of the evidence establishing his guilt, any alleged error from the 
district court's refusal to give a Holder instruction was harmless. 
IV. 
Reading The Jury Instructions As A Whole, Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The 
Instructions Given By The District Court Violated His Constitutional Rights 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford raises several challenges to the jury instructions. Wbile the exact 
nature of his first challenge is somewhat vague, based upon the issue he has articulated 
and the case he has cited, it appears Shackelford contends the conspiracy to commit first-
degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree arson instructions are 
unconstitutional because there was no instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree 
which party committed an overt act and which overt act was perforrned. (Brief, pp.33-
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36.) Based upon the instructions as a whole, the jury was sufficiently apprised its 
verdicts regarding the overt acts had to be unanimous. Moreover, because Shackelford 
was found guilty of the underlying offenses of first-degree murder and first-degree arson, 
which were both alleged as overt acts, the jury necessarily found, unanimously, at least 
one overt act sufficient to establish the conspiracy counts. Finally, unanimity is not 
required with respect to overt acts when multiple overt acts are alleged to have occurred. 
Shackelford also contends because the elements instruction for first-degree arson 
in instruction 19 did not contain identical language from the indictment instruction in 
instruction IS, the jury was unconstitutionally "confused by this discrepancy." (Brief, 
pp.37-3S.) Because instruction 19 generally followed the elements ofLC. §§ 18-S01 and 
802, Shackelford has failed to establish error. 
Shackelford further contends instruction 33 involving accomplice liability 
violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict and he was not on notice that he could be 
found guilty based upon an aider and abettor liability theory. (Brief, pp.3S-41.) Because 
Idaho has abolished all distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, there is no 
constitutional violation. 
Finally, Shackelford contends instruction 30 was ambiguous because it failed to 
define the word, "produced." (Brief, pp.41-43.) Because Shackelford has failed to 
support this claim with citation to any authority, it has been waived. Should this Court 
address the merits of this claim, it still fails because the word, "produced," is a term of 
common usage that did not need further definition. 
Even if there was error as a result of any of the alleged deficiencies in the jury 
instructions, any alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly and 
adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 264; State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 
477,489,873 P.2d 122 (1994); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230 (Ct. 
App. 1996). A defendant is not entitled to an instruction that is an erroneous statement of 
the law, not suppOlted by the evidence, an impermissible comment on the evidence or 
adequately covered by other instructions. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 
1327 (1987). "In order to determine whether the defendant's proposed instruction should 
have been given, this Court must examine the instructions that were given and the 
evidence that was adduced at trial." Id. To be reversible error, any error in the 
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 
131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d 1082 (1998). 
C. The Jury Was Properly Instructed Regarding Unanimity As To The. Overt Acts 
Required To Establish Shackelford Was Guilty Of Conspiracy To Commit First-
Degree Murder And First-Degree Arson 
The district court gave instruction 23 explaining the elements for conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Conspiracy to Commit 
First Degree Murder in Count IV, the state must prove each of the 
fo llowing: 
1. On or about 25 th to 29th days of May, 1999 
2. in the state ofldaho, County of Latah 
3. the defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford, and Mary 
Margaret Abitz and Sonja Marie Abitz agreed 
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4. to commit the crime of Murder in the First Degree 
5. the defendant intended that the crime would be 
committed 
6. one of the parties to the agreement perfonned at least one 
of the following acts: 
A. Dale Carter Shackelford threatened 
to kill Donna Fontaine. 
B. Dale Carter Shackelford hid his 
presence from Donna Fontaine, Gary 
Fontaine, and Ted Meske. 
C. Dale Carter Shackelford went to 
Donna Fontaine's residence at 2168 Three 
Bear Road. 
D. Dale Carter Shackelford shot Donna 
Fontaine with a shotgun and pistol, killing 
her. 
7. such act was done for the purpose of carrying out 
the agreement. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
guilty. 
(R., p.2200.) 
The district court also gave instruction 26 explaining the elements for conspiracy 
to commit first-degree arson as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Conspiracy to Commit 
Arson in the First Degree in Count V, the state must prove each of the 
following: 
1. On or about the 25th to 29th days of May, 1999 
2. in the county of Latah 
3. in the state ofIdaho 
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4. the defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford, and Mary 
Margaret Abitz and Sonja Marie Abitz agreed 
5. to commit the crime of Arson in the First Degree (as 
explained in instructions No. 19 and No. 20) 
6. the defendant intended that the crime be committed 
7. one of the parties to the agreement performed at 
least one of the following acts: 
A. Dale Carter Shackelford hid his 
presence from Donna Fontaine, Gary 
Fontaine, and Ted Meske; 
B. Dale Carter Shackelford went to 
Donna Fontaine's residence at 2168 Three 
Bear Road. 
C. Dale Carter Shackelford poured 
flammable liquid in the garage at that 
location; 
D. Dale Carter Shackelford lit fires in 
both stories of the garage 
8. such act was done for the purpose of carrying out 
the agreement. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Conspiracy to 
Commit Arson in the First Degree. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of 
Conspiracy to commit Arson in the First Degree. 
(R., pp.2203-04.) 
In addition to the unanimity instruction included within the final paragraph of 
each of the elements instructions, the district court also gave instruction 41, explaining in 
relevant part, "In this case, your verdicts must be unanimous." (R., p.2220.) Instruction 
43 also advised the jury its verdict had to be unanimous. (R., p.2222.) 
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Based upon the unanimity instruction given in the final paragraph of instructions 
23 and 26 and the specific instructions given in instructions 41 and 43, if a unanimity 
instruction was required as alleged by Shackelford, it is clear the jury was properly 
instructed regarding unanimity with regard to the two conspiracy charges. See United 
States v. Jones, 712 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing the instructions as a 
whole, the jury was sufficiently instructed as to unanimity regarding the overt acts). 
More importantly, it is clear the jury unanimously found at least one overt act for 
each of the two conspiracy counts. In conspiracy cases, the state is merely required to 
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is an agreement between two or more 
individuals to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in the 
furtherance of the illegal purpose accompanied by the requisite intent to commit the 
underlying substantive offense." State v. Garci!!, 102 Idaho 378, 384, 630 P.2d 665 
(1981) (emphasis added). When a jury unanimously finds a defendant guilty of an 
underlying criminal offense which also constitutes an overt act, the courts have uniformly 
rejected any claim the jury's verdict was not unanimous with respect to the overt act. 
United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jorgensen, 
144 F.3d 550, 561 (8th Cir. 1998). 
In Shackelford's case, it is clear the jury unanimously found he committed at least 
one of the charged overt acts in each of the conspiracy counts. Shackelford was 
unanimously convicted of murdering Donna, and he has not challenged the unanimity of 
that verdict. (R., p.2228.) The elements instruction for conspiracy to commit first-degree 
murder alleged the fourth overt act was that Shackelford killed Donna. (R., p.2200.) 
Based upon the jury's unanimous verdict establishing Shackelford was guilty of Donna's 
49 
first-degree murder, the jury also had to find, unanimously, the fourth overt act and that 
Shackelford was the individual who committed that act. The same is true with respect to 
conspiracy to commit first-degree arson. Because the jury unanimously found 
Shackelford guilty of first-degree arson CR., p.2226) and he has not challenged the 
unanimity of that verdict, the jury necessarily found, unanimously, that he committed the 
third and fourth overt acts of conspiracy to commit first-degree arson (R., p.2203). 
Finally, should this Court determine there was not unanimity with respect to the 
overt acts, the state submits such an instruction is unnecessary. In Schad v. Arizona, 501 
u.s. 624, 628 (1991), the defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree murder. At 
trial, "the prosecntor advanced theories of both premeditated murder and felony murder," 
and the court instructed the jury that "[ f]irst degree murder is murder which is the result 
of premeditation. . .. Murder which is committed in the attempt to commit robbery is 
also first degree murder." Id. at 629 (alteration in original). On appeal, Schad contended, 
"his conviction under instructions that did not require the jury to agree on one of the 
alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder is unconstitutional." Id. at 630. 
The Supreme Court disagreed: 
We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts in such 
cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of 
commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify one 
alone. In these cases, as in litigation generally, "different jurors may be 
persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the 
bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach 
agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict." 
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449,110 S.Ct. 1227,1236-1237, 
108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) CBLACKMUN, J., concurring) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Id. at 632. The Court then concluded it was not unconstitutional for the Arizona courts to 
treat premeditation and the commission of a felony as equivalent means with respect to 
50 
the mens rea element of first-degree murder rather than separate offenses, particularly 
since neither premeditation nor the commission of a felony were formal, independent 
elements of first-degree murder as that crime was defined by the Arizona legislature. Id. 
at 636-45. 
Idaho's appellate courts have adopted the rationale of Schad. First, in State v. 
Nunez, 133 Idaho 13,981 P.2d 738 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether 
the defendant was entitled to a unanimity instruction in relation to charges that he 
misused public funds in violation of I.e. § 18-5701, which defines numerous acts 
constituting the offense. Relying on Schad, the court explained: 
Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach 
agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. 
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), 
citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1236-
37, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Under Idaho 
Code § 18-5701, a defendant can be found guilty of misuse of public 
money for any number of acts proscribed. The statute provides alternative 
means of satisfying the actus reus element of the single offense of misuse 
of public money. 
Nunez, 133 Idaho at 19. 
In Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 369-70, 33 P.3d 841 (Ct. App. 2001), the 
defendant was charged with one count of lewd conduct based on an incident in which he 
had both manual-genital and genital-genital contact with his daughter. Downing claimed 
his attorney was ineffective because he failed to request a unanimity instruction requiring 
the jury to decide which type of contact he committed. Id. at 372. The court carefully 
examined Schad, and United States v. Kim, 196 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1999), as follows: 
In Kim, the defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing 
stolen goods under an aiding and abetting theory. The statute under which 
Kim was charged prohibits aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, 
inducing or procuring the commission of a crime, each an alternative 
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means by which a defendant may be held criminally liable for the 
underlying substantive offense. Kim asserted on appeal that some jurors 
might have concluded that he "commanded," While others may have 
concluded that he "ordered," or "assisted" in the crime of possession of 
stolen goods. In affirming Kim's conviction the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals relied upon Schad v. Arizona .... Following Schad, the Ninth 
Circuit held that: 
[I]t was not necessary for the jurors in this case to 
unanimously agree on a specific classification of Kim's 
conduct. Nor was it necessary for them to specifY which 
conduct led them to conclude that Kim was an accessory. 
All that was necessary was a unanimous decision that Kim 
knowingly and intentionally helped his [co-defendant) in 
the possession of stolen goods. Therefore, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a specific 
unanimity instruction to the jury. 
Downing, 136 Idaho at 373. The court examined I.C. § 18-1508, and concluded, 
"Downing would be just as guilty of lewd conduct through manual contact as he would 
be through genital contact. The prohibited acts are merely alternative means by which a 
defendant (Downing) may be held criminally liable for the offense oflewd conduct." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted Schad and its progeny, concluding a 
unanimity instruction is not required to determine whether a jury's verdict is based upon 
the defendant being a principal or an aid and abettor. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 
977, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). In the context of unanimity regarding overt acts, the federal 
courts have also applied these general principals. See e.g. United States v. Alli-Ba10gun, 
72 F.3d 9,12-13 (2nd Cir. 1995) (citing cases); United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 
187-88 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hubbard, 889 F.2d 277, 279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
United States v. Garcia-Rivera, 353 FJd 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2003), upon which 
Shackelford relies, is readily distinguishable. The court makes no mention of Schad or 
Kim, presumably because it is an entirely different matter to have a jury find someone 
52 
guilty of a criminal offense that occurred on alternative days as opposed to finding 
someone guilty based npon alternative theories of the same offense. Further, as noted in 
United States v. Brown, 65 MJ. 356, 359 (C.A.A.F. 2007), "Not only has Garcia-Rivera 
never been cited outside the Ninth Circuit, but the case has been recently distinguished 
within it. See United States v. Johal, 428 F.3d 823, 329 (9th Cir. 2005)." 
Based upon Schad and its application by Idaho's appellate courts, the district 
court did not error by failing to give further unanimity instructions regarding the 
conspiracy charges. 
D. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Jury Confusion Regarding The Elements Of 
First-Degree Arson 
The district court gave instruction 18, which merely restated count III from the 
Indictment, as follows: 
The Defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, in COUNT 
III is charged with the crime of ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE alleged 
to have been committed as follows: 
(R., p.2195.) 
COUNT III 
That the Defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
on or about the 29th day of May, 1999, in the County of 
Latah, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully, by fire 
or explosion, damage a dwelling, to wit: a garage with 
upstairs living quarters located at 2168 Three Bear road, by 
pouring a flammable liquid in the building and lighting a 
fire on both stories. 
To such charge the Defendant has pleaded not guilty. 
Addressing the elements of first-degree arson, the district court gave instrnction 
19, in relevant part, as follows: 
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Arson in the First Degree, 
the State must prove each of the follow: 
1. On or about the 29th day of May 1999 
2. in the county of Latah 
3. state ofIdaho 
4. the defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford, willfully 
5. by fire or explosion 
6. damaged 
7. a dwelling, whether occupied or not. 
(R., p.2196.) 
Shackelford contends, because the elements instruction did not include the phrase, 
"lighting a fire on both stories," that the jury was "confused by this discrepancy." (Brief, 
p.37.) However, "[a]n instruction to the jury that essentially follows the words of a 
statute normally is not error." 'Ordinarily, the language employed by the legislature in 
defining a crime is deemed to be best suited for that purpose, and error cannot be 
predicated upon its use in informations and instructions. '" State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 
358,362,690 P.2d 293 (1984) (quoting State v. Brooks, 49 Idaho 404, 409, 288 P. 894 
(1930)). Idaho Code § 18-802 expressly delineates the elements required for first-degree 
arson, in relevant part, as "Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, 
damages: (l) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not." 
Merely because the Indictment included the phrase, "lighting a fire on both 
stories," does not mean the jury was unconstitutionally confused because the additional 
language "add[ ed] nothing more than emphasis to certain elements of the instructions 
already given." State v. Roles, 122 Idaho 138, 143,832 P.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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Further, any alleged confusion was clearly rectified based upon the district court's 
clarifying instruction as follow: 
[Ilnstructions 18 and 25 state the charges of arson in the first degree and 
conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree, which are contained in the 
indictment. 
Instructions 19 and 26 contain the elements that are necessary for 
the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant to be found 
guilty of arson in the first degree and conspiracy to commit arson in the 
first degree. You will need to review the elements instructions, 
instructions numbers 19 and 26, to determine the answer to your 
questions. 
(Tr., p.5460l 
Based upon the district court's clarifying instruction, there is no doubt the jury 
was properly advised of the elements for finding Shackelford guilty of first-degree arson, 
any alleged confusion was rectified by the additional instruction, and the verdict was 
properly based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
E. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The Aider And Abettor Instruction Also 
Required Giving A Unanimity Instruction Or That He Was Denied Due Process 
When The Indictment Allegedly Failed To Provide Notice He Could Be Found 
Guilty Based Upon An Aider And Abettor Theory 
The district court gave instruction 33 explaining aider and abettor liability as 
follows: 
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly 
participates in the acts constituting a crime and persons, who, either before 
or during its commission, intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes, 
encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a 
crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both can be 
found guilty of the crime. Mere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent 
6 The jury's question read as follows, "Regarding instructions umber 25, 26, number 18 
clarification: Must it be determined that the fire was lit on both stories before it can be 
determined arson? Or that the defendant can be guilty of arson as in number 18?" (Tr., 
p.5460.) 
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consent to, the planning or commission of a crime is not sufficient to make 
one an accomplice. 
(R., p.2212.) 
Shackelford initially contends instruction 33 violated his "right to a unanimous 
jury verdict," particularly since the Indictment contained no language expressly charging 
him with aiding and abetting any of the crimes charged. (Brief, pp.38-39.) As noted 
above, the Idaho Supreme Court in Johnson, 145 Idaho at 977-78, recently decided this 
exact question. After reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Schad, and examining 
I.C. § 19-1430, which abolished all distinction between principals and aiders and 
abettors, the court recognized where "only one criminal act was charged - first-degree 
murder - and there was no evidence presented of additional criminal acts," "there is no 
basis for a specific unanimity instruction." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 977-78 (citing cases). 
Not only has Shackelford failed to distinguish Johnson, he has not cited it in his 
brief. While Shackelford was charged with multiple criminal acts, there is still no basis 
for the district court to give any additional unanimity instructions. Johnson was likewise 
charged with two counts of first-degree murder. Id. at 972. Therefore, when the court 
stated, "only one criminal act was charged," it was referring to the fact there was no 
"evidence of more criminal acts than have been charged." Id. at 977. Additionally, the 
jury in Shackelford's case was also instructed, "Each count charges a separate and 
distinct offense. You must decide each connt separately on the evidence and the law that 
applies to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. The defendant may be 
found guilty or not guilty on any or all of the offenses charged." (R., p.2214.) Because 
the district court did not err by failing to give an additional unanimity instruction, 
Shackelford's claim fails. 
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Shackelford further contends he was denied due process because the Indictment 
allegedly failed to provide notice he could be found guilty based upon aider and abettor 
liability. (Brief, pp.40-41.) The supreme court also addressed this issue in Johnson, 145 
Idaho at 975-76 (citing State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 25, 211 P.2d 142 (1949)), 
recognizing that since 1949, Idaho has concluded the information is sufficient to put the 
defendant on trial upon either the theory he was a principal or an aider and abettor, 
irrespective of whether the information charged only one theory. Adopting the Tenth 
Circuit's analysis, the court also rejected the contention that the facts constituting aiding 
and abetting are elements, '" a charge of the predicate crime puts defendant on notice that 
the jury may be instructed on aiding and abetting, thus satisfying any due process 
concerns.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (loth Cir. 
2006)). Finally, after exhaustively reviewing the law from other jurisdictions, the court 
declined to overrule Ayres and its progeny, concluding, "it is well-established in Idaho 
that it is unnecessary to charge the defendant with aiding and abetting." Id. at 976-77. 
Shackelford contends his case is governed by State v. Chapa, 127 Idaho 786, 786, 
906 P.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1995). (Brief, p.40.) To the extent Chapa remains viable 
authority after Johnson, it is readily distinguishable. Unlike Shackelford, in Chapa, two 
different men forcibly removed the victim from a vehicle, beat her and forced her to have 
sexual intercourse with each of them. Id. at 787. Chapa was charged only with the rape 
in which he was alleged to have committed the act of intercourse and not the act 
involving his co-defendant. rd. The jury was given the same aider and abettor 
instruction given to Shackelford's jury. Id. at 788. The court of appeals concluded the 
aider and abettor instruction raised questions of Chapa's guilt regarding two crimes, both 
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the rape committed through his own forcible intercourse with the victim and the separate 
rape committed by his co-defendant as a principal, with Chapa's aid or encouragement." 
Id. at 789. Because the information charged a single offense involving only Chapa, but 
the instruction permitted the jury to consider two distinct crimes, the court of appeals 
concluded there was a due process violation. Id. at 789-90. 
Obviously, this problem does not exist in Shackelford's case. There was evidence 
presented establishing but one single count for each alleged crime. For example, there 
was a single count of first -degree murder alleging Donna was a victim, a single count of 
first-degree murder alleging Fred was a victim, a single count of first-degree arson, etc.; 
there was no evidence that could have been interpreted as establishing "duplicity" as 
detailed by the court of appeals. See id. at 789 ("The inclusion of more than one offense 
in a single count of the charging document"). 
Because Shackelford has failed to even cite, let alone distinguish Johnson, he has 
failed to establish he was denied due process by the district court's failure to give an 
additional unanimity instruction. 
F. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The Instructions Regarding Preparation Of 
False Evidence Required Further Definition 
Shackelford was also charged with preparing false evidence in violation of I.C. § 
18-2602, which reads as follows: 
Every person guilty of preparing any false or antedated book, 
paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to 
produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful 
purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry 
whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of a felony. 
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This charge stemmed from a tape recording of an argument between Shackelford 
and Bernadette Lasater, which was fraudulently created with the intent to produce the 
tape recording or allow it to be produced for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose before the 
grand jury. (R., p.3.) The district court provided the elements of the criminal offense in 
instruction 30 as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Preparing False Evidence, 
the State must prove each of the following: 
l. During a period of time between August, 1999, and 
January 24, 2000 
2. in the state ofIdaho 
3. the defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford, willfully 
prepared false evidence 
4. with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be 
produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, 
as genuine or true 
5. at a grand jury proceeding in Latah County which 
was authorized by law. 
If you find any of the above have not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Preparing 
False Evidence. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant is guilty of Preparing False Evidence. 
(R., p.2209.) 
Shackelford contends the jury should have been instructed on the definition of 
"produce." (Brief, pp.41-43.) Shackelford has failed to support this contention with 
citation to any authority. Therefore, the claim has been waived. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 
511; Creech, 132 Idaho at 19. 
Even if the court addresses the merits of this claim, it fails. As explained in 
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 264 (internal citations omitted), "Terms which are of common 
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usage and are sufficiently generally understood need not be further defined when 
instructing the jury. Ordinarily the language employed by the legislature in defining a 
crime is deemed to be best suited for that purpose, and error carmot be predicated on its 
use in jury instructions." For example, in Zichko, 129 Idaho at 264, the supreme court 
affirmed the district court's refusal to give an instruction defining "residence and 
domicile because they are terms of common understanding." 
In State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498 (Ct. App. 2001), the 
defendant conceded the word "permit" is a word of common understanding, but 
contended "there are two mutually exclusive methods of permitting an act." Quoting the 
preface to the Idaho Criminal Jury instructions, which states, "the irresistible impulse to 
define words of ordinary English is unfortunately pervasive. It should be curbed," the 
court of appeals concluded, "the word 'permit' falls within the class of ordinary words 
for which no additional definition is required." Id. 
The same analysis applies for "produce." The state is unaware of any jurisdiction 
requiring the trial court to define "produce." Shackelford's contention that, "[b]ecause of 
the lack of a coherent definition, some jurors may have defined 'produce' as 'to make,' 
while others may have defined it as 'to give,'" misses the mark. The issue with respect to 
the preparation of false evidence is not the definition of "produce" and whether it requires 
the defendant "to make" or "to give," but the preparation of the false matter with a 
specific intent involving fraud or deceit. Therefore, further defining "produce" was 
unnecessary and would have been inconsequential. 
Shackelford's final argument, that the "instruction specifically requires to [sic] 
find that all the elements occurred in Idaho" (Brief, p.42), is also without merit. 
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Instruction 36 expressly explained, "When the commission of a cnme or offense, 
commenced outside of this state, is consummated within this state, jurisdiction is in this 
state, though the defendant was out of the state at the time of the commission of the 
offense charged." (R., p.2215.) Therefore, even if the tape was not made in Idaho, 
consummation of the crime was completed when the tape was received in Idaho because 
Shackelford's preparation of the tape was with the specific intent to deceive an Idaho 
grand jury. 
G. Any Alleged Error In The Instructions Was Hannless 
"To constitute error entitling a defendant to relief, an instruction must mislead the 
jury or prejudice the defendant." Thompson, 143 Idaho at 157. The error is harmless if 
the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been 
the same absent the error. Slater, 136 Idaho at 300. Based upon the instructions given 
by the district court defining reasonable doubt and that the burden was on the state to 
prove Shackelford's guilt, and the overwhelming nature of the evidence establishing his 
guilt, any alleged error from the instructions given by the district court was harmless. 
V. 
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The State Was Required To Disclose Dr. Howard's 
"Peer Review Notes" Or That The Notes Would Have Resulted In A Different Verdict 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford contends the state withheld exculpatory evidence by allegedly failing 
to disclose "peer review notes provided by Dr. John Howard concerning Dr. Cihak's 
'guesstimate' of the time of death based on stomach contents." (Brief, p.43.) Because 
the infonnation of which Shackelford complains was not in the control or possession of 
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the state, there was not duty to disclose, particularly since the information was readily 
available to Shackelford over the internet. More importantly, Shackelford has failed to 
establish a reasonable probability of a different result stemming from the alleged 
withholding of the information. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quoting 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995)), the supreme court 
reaffirmed the standard of review in post-conviction cases in which summary dismissal 
was granted by the trial court: 
"In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly 
granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the 
petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if 
accepted as true. A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted 
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. The 
standard to be applied to a trial court's determination that no material issue 
of fact exists is the same type of determination as in a summary judgment 
proceeding. (citations omitted throughout). 
C. Facts Regarding Shackelford's Brady Claim 
During Shackelford's trial, Dr. Robert Cihak testified regarding the autopsy he 
completed on Fred's body. Dr. Cihak specifically testified regaJ:ding his examination of 
the contents of Fred's stomach, discussing the food fragments that were discovered and 
opining Fred had eaten "probably several hours before he -- within several hours of his 
death." (Tr., pp.22l0-l0.) When asked if he could determine the length of time since 
Fred had eaten and the time of death, Dr. Cihak explained: 
It's hard to be exact in a measurement. The condition of the food 
can be affected by several things; however, usually we empty our 
stomachs in four to six hours after having eaten a dinner. The state of the 
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fragments that I found in [Fred's stomach were] relatively undigested, 
would leave a window possible from anywhere from half an hour after 
having eaten up to three hours after having eaten. 
(Tr., pp.2211-12.) After reiterating, "That is my best guesstimate, yes," Dr. Cihak 
discussed the multiple factors and variables that affect digestion and further explained, 
"There are many factors that have been listed, but one can never be exact because one 
doesn't know at the time of autopsy what was going on necessarily from the time that 
victim has eaten." (Tr., p.2212.) On cross-exanlination, Dr. Cihak was again questioned 
about determining the time of death based upon stomach contents and reaffirmed, "This 
is a very controversial area. And there are people that feel some factors either speed or 
delay, and other people will take the opposite. This is a very, let us say, not scientifically 
identified area." (Tr., p.2222.) Additionally, Dr. Cihak expressly stated he did "peer 
review" in this case. (Tr., p.22l9.) 
In his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Shackelford contended 
the state withheld exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose "Peer Review of Dr. 
Cihak's notes by John Howard." (UPCPA, R., pp.2543-44.) The exact nature of the 
claim was not discovered until Shackelford filed his response to the state's motion to 
dismiss and attached a bundle of materials apparently obtained from Dr. John Howard as 
a result of a subpoena, which included a letter from Dr. Howard, Dr. Cihak's autopsy 
report regarding the autopsy on Fred's body, a letter from Detective Kurtis Hall and 
various articles regarding studies associated with determining the time of death based 
upon stomach contents. (UPCPA, R., pp.1862-63, 1917-54.) While Shackelford 
conceded he received Dr. Howard's letter prior to trial, he contended he did not receive 
the additional materials from Dr. Howard. (UPCPA, R., pp.1862-63.) 
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The focus of Shackelford's argument was upon the articles. (UPCPA, Tr., 
pp.444-57.) After reviewing the articles and comparing them with Dr. Cihak's testimony, 
the district court granted the state's motion to dismiss this claim, concluding, "These 
abstracts do not contradict the trial testimony of Dr. Cihak that the use of stomach 
contents can give only a 'guesstimate' of the time of death .... Because these articles do 
not contradict the evidence presented at the Petitioner's trial they are not exculpatory." 
(UPCPA, R., pp.3589-90.) 
D. Standards Of Law Regarding Withholding Of Exculpatory Evidence 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and its progeny, the 
prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and 
material to either guilt or punishment. The suppression of such evidence violates due 
process. Id. at 86-87. To prove a Brady violation, Shackelford must show three 
components: "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the 
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). The Court discu.ssed the issue of prejudice or 
materiality in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995): 
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a 
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not 
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received 
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly 
shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial." [Citation omitted). 
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In Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-36, the Court reiterated, once a reviewing court has 
found a constitutional violation applying the materiality test from United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), there is no need for further harmless error analysis. 
The Court also explained that in assessing materiality, the withheld evidence is viewed 
collectively, "not item-by-item." Id. at 436-38. 
E. Because Of Dr. Brown's Exceptionally Limited Role, The State Had No Duty To 
Disclose The Articles 
The state recognizes "Brady is an obligation of not just the individual prosecutor 
assigned to the case, but of all the government agents having a significant role in 
investigating and prosecuting the offense." State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 433, 885 
P.2d 1144 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 ("the individual prosecutor 
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's 
behalf in the case, including the police"). However, "a prosecutor is not required to 
disclose 'evidence the prosecutor does not possess or evidence of which the prosecutor 
could not reasonably be imputed to have knowledge or control. ", State v. Avelar, 132 
Idaho 775, 781, 979 P.2d 648 (1999). 
Dr. Howard was not a state's witness, but merely conducted the peer review 
associated with the autopsies conducted by Dr. Cihak. (UPCPA, Tr., p.446.) Therefore, 
it is difficult to fathom that the state was obligated to disclose independent research 
apparently conducted by Dr. Howard on the Internet. Rather, this situation is akin to 
Avelar, where a police officer's criminal activity prior to the defendant's trial, of which 
the prosecutor was unaware, could not be imputed to the state because the officer was 
"merely a paid informant at the time of the investigatioll, and was acting in that role when 
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he testified at trial." 132 Idaho at 781. Considering Dr. Brown's exceptionally limited 
role, neither should the articles he researched on the Internet be imputed to the state. See 
Queen v. State, 2008 WL 2152574, *3 (Ct. App. 2008) (because the record did not reflect 
that the FBI played any role in investigating or prosecuting Queen, the state was not 
required to disclose a witness' prior felony record available on the NCIC database). 
This is particularly true because the articles were readily available to Shackelford 
by merely conducting an Internet search. "In such a situation, the defendant bears the 
responsibility for his failure to investigate diligently." Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 
F.3d 511, 526 (5th Cir. 2008). See also In re Magwood, 113 F.3d 1544, 1548 (8th Cir. 
1997) ("Petitioner does not make out a Brady claim because he cannot show that the 
State suppressed pretrial statements made in his presence"). 
Other jurisdictions have concluded defendants are required to investigate 
information known to them. As explained in Raley v. Ylst, 444 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 
2006), when a defendant possesses "the salient facts regarding the existence of the 
[evidence] that he claims [was] withheld," there is no Brady violation. In United States 
v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9tl1 Cir. 1991), tlle court recognized, "When, as here, a 
defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed Brady material on 
his own, there is no suppression by the govermuent." See also United States v. Bender, 
304 F.3d 161,164 (lIth Cir. 2002) (Bender's argument "is further weakened by evidence 
that Bender himself was aware of Heath's mental health history"); United States v. 
Zuazo, 243 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The government does not suppress evidence 
in violation of Brady by failing to disclose evidence to which the defendant had access 
through other channels"). 
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As expillined in United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 673 (11 th Cir. 1983), 
"Brady does not give defendants a right to have the government construct the defense and 
identify defense witnesses." See also United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (Stll Cir. 
1980) ("Truth, justice, and the American way do not, however, require the Government 
to discover and develop the defendant's entire defense"). 
F. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish A Reasonable Probability Of A Different 
Result 
Even if the state had a duty to disclose the articles, Shackelford has failed to 
establish a reasonable probability of a different result. Dr. Cihak's opinion regarding 
whether the digestion of food could aid in determining the time of death was anything but 
unequivocal. He expressly stated his opinion was nothing more than his "best 
guesstimate," "one can never be exact because one doesn't know at the time of autopsy 
what was going on necessarily from the time that victim has eaten" (Tr., p.2212), and 
"[t]his is a very controversial area. And there are people that feel some factors either 
speed or delay, and other people will take the opposite. This is a very, let us say, not 
scientifically identified area" (Tr., p.2222). In fact, when asked by the trial court if the 
articles "substantively disagree with what Dr. Cihak testified to," Shackelford's attorney 
responded, "They don't seem to contradict the citations to the record that the State gave." 
(UPCP A, Tr., p.4S2.) While counsel reiterated, "They don't directly contradict," he 
contended, "I think that they undermine, to a degree, the reliability." (UPCPA, Tr., 
p.4S2.) However, outside of opining Dr. Cihak could have been questioned about the 
"scientific reliability" of rendering an opinion regarding the time of death based on 
gastric contents, counsel provided no other explanation establishing how the articles 
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further undermined Dr. Cihak's opinion, particularly since Dr. Cihak testified, "This is a 
very, let us say, not scientifically identified area." (Tr., p.2222.) 
Because Shackelford has failed to establish disclosure of the articles would have 
established a reasonable probability of a different verdict, his claim fails. 
VI. 
Because Shackelford Has Failed To Establish He Could Have Retained Private Counsel, 
He Was Not Denied His Right To Counsel Of Choice 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford contends he was deprived of his right to counsel of choice based 
upon the seizure by the state of approximately $5,000.00 found on his person at the time 
of his arrest. (Brief, pp.44-46.) Shackelford contends if the state had returned the money 
he could have hired counsel of his own choosing instead of having counsel appointed. 
Because the right to counsel applies only to individuals who can afford to retain 
counsel and Shackelford has failed to establish $5,000.00 would have retained an 
attorney to represent him in a capital double first-degree murder case, which included 
multiple counts of conspiracy and involved extensive forensic evidence stemming from 
the arson case associated with Shackelford's attempt to destroy all the evidence 
associated with Donna and Fred's murders, his claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
While it appears Idaho has yet to discuss the standard of review when reviewing a 
counsel of choice issue, the federal courts have generally found the issue is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197,1216 (loth Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Childress, 58 FJd 693, 734-35 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. 
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Reeves, 892 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 
814-15 (3 rd Cir. 1988). Appellate courts will defer to the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hawkins, l31 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22 
(Ct. App. 1998). "Findings are clearly erroneous only when unsupported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record." State v. Thomas, l33 Idaho 682, 686, 991 P.2d 
870 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. Facts Regarding The Appointment Of Counsel 
At the time of his initial arraigmuent, Shackelford expressly requested that he be 
appointed counsel. (Pretrial Tr., p.16.) When he was asked to complete the requisite 
forms discussing his financial resources, Shackelford stated he could not complete the 
form "because I have no information." (Pretrial Tr., p.17.) After initially stating, "I 
don't have anything" and "as far as my monthly earnings prior to arrest, I don't know of 
anything." (Pretrial Tr., p.l8.) However, when asked ifhe had other assets available to 
retain counsel, Shackelford responded, "It's a possibility, Your Honor. I do not know at 
this point. I have vehicles which I could sell, but I don't know where the vehicles are 
right now. I had money in my pocket, but Detective Hall took it as evidence and now I'm 
being told that I have no money." (Pretrial Tr., p.19.) Shackelford further explained he 
had a receipt stating Deputy Hall had seized $4,898.00 and a second receipt for $4.57. 
(pretrial Tr., p.l9.) After further discussion, the district court told Shackelford to 
complete the financial form, he would be afforded an opportunity to obtain the relevant 
information and the hearing would be continued for one day. (pretrial Tr., pp.l9-21.) 
The following day Shackelford again complained of "the same problem," but 
advised the court he had contacted two attorneys, "James Siebe and Mr. Walker, both 
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which have described to me that a case of this magnitude is going to take at least 
$100,000." (Pretrial Tr., pp.31-32.) Shackelford explained he could 'just about 
guarantee I don't have that much in my canteen account." (Pretrial Tr., p.32.) He further 
complained that he could not complete the questionnaire "because I don't know much of 
the information that is requested here and I don't want to be charged with perjury." 
(Pretrial Tr., p.32.) However, based upon the limited information provided by 
Shackelford, the court "tentatively" appointed counsel and explained, "to the extent that 
you have resources to pay them that are discovered at some point in the future, I will use 
them to compensate the attorneys that I appoint for you." (Pretrial Tr., p.33.) The court 
then appointed Barker and Mahaffy to represent Shackelford. (Pretrial Tr., p.33.) 
Shackelford's Financial Statement was filed later that day, providing very little 
information regarding his financial status. (R., p.29.) 
The following day the prosecutor offered to release the money confiscated from 
Shackelford. (Pretrial Tr., p.56.) However, Barker stated he would prefer to "prepare a 
response on the financial matters dealing with all of that, rather than just the cash that 
was in his pocket." (Pretrial Tr., pp.55-56.) The court again reviewed the matter, 
explaining, "to the extent that you are able to pay for counsel, I expect you to pay for 
counseL .. , if you have resources that are available, I would expect those resources to be 
used to reimburse the county for their expenses in retaining Messrs. Barker and Mahaffy 
in representing you." (Pretrial Tr., pp.57-58.) Shackelford expressly stated he 
understood the district court's admonition. (Pretrial Tr., p.58.) 
On April 11, 2000, Shackelford filed a motion seeking release of the $4,902.57 
seized at the time of his arrest. (R., pp.125-27.) At the hearing on Shackelford's motion, 
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the district court reiterated the difficulty associated with getting reliable information 
regarding his finances and not making a determination that he was indigent because of 
those difficulties. (Pretrial Tr., pp.99-101.) Barker further discussed Shackelford's 
financial difficulties since his arrest, including being "pushed into bankruptcy." (Pretrial 
Tr., pp.l02-03.) The state responded by requesting to file an affidavit establishing the 
expenses associated with representing Shackelford had already exceeded $5,000.00, and 
requesting that the money be used to reimburse the county for expenses. (Pretrial Tr., 
ppJ 04-05.) After permitting counsel to explain why Shackelford had previously been 
evasive regarding his financial situation, the court found, "I don't thing he was trying to 
be helpful, I don't thing he was trying to be candid." (Pretrial Tr., p.l 07.) The court 
denied Shackelford's motion and ordered that the money be placed in an interest bearing 
account until further order of the court. (R., pp.l47-49.) 
The state is unaware of anything further happening regarding this money until 
Shackelford raised the claim in his post-conviction proceedings. (UPCPA, R., pp.2548-
50.) Granting the state's motion to summarily dismiss this claim, the district court made 
the following findings and conclusions: 
The Petitioner was given several opportunities during the early stages of 
this case to show he had the wherewithal to hire an attorney during his 
criminal proceedings. He was unable to do so. He also engaged in 
evasiveness to a degree never before or since witnessed by this Court. The 
Petitioner has not, and cannot, allege that the $5,000 seized would have 
been sufficient to finance his defense to capital murder. Such a claim is 
absurd. The Petitioner's trial counsel, D. Ray Barker and Steven C. 
Mahaffey, were jointly paid over $500,000 to represent the Petitioner 
through his sentencing. Arguing that $5,000, one-hundredth of the 
amount spent, would have been sufficient to secure representation in a 
case of this magnitude is ludicrous. 
(UPCPA, R., p.3598.) 
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D. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enj oy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." "One element of 
this basic guarantee is the right to counsel of choice." United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 
1050, 1974 (3 rd CiL 1996). However, "[t]he right to counsel of one's choice 
encompassed within the Sixth Amendment is not absolute." United States v. Carrera, 259 
F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2001); see State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 930-31, 935 P.2d 183 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Carmen, 114 Idaho 791, 793, 760 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1988). 
As explained in Caplin & Drysdale. Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) 
(quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988», "those who do not have the 
means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are 
adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts. '[A] defendant may not 
insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford. ", See also Schell v. Witek, 218 
F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing cases establishing the right to choice of counsel 
is not absolute, but limited to those who are financially able to retain counsel). 
The right to choice of counsel is further limited by "considerations of judicial 
administration," Voigt, 89 F. 3d at 1974, and "must not obstruct orderly judicial procedure 
or deprive courts of their inherent power to control the administration of justice." United 
States v. Vallery, 108 F.3d 155, 157 (8 th Cir. 1997). Therefore, if the "requirements of 
the fair and proper administration of justice" outweigh the right to counsel, there is not 
abuse of discretion if a defendant is not permitted to have his counsel of choice during 
criminal proceedings. United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2001). For 
example, "[i]f a defendant's attempted exercise of his choice is dilatory, the trial court 
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can require him to proceed with designated counsel." United States v. Vallery, 108 F.3d 
155, 157 (8 th Cir. 1997). 
Shackelford has not challenged the district court's findings, particularly with 
regard to his "evasiveness" and that the $5,000.00 would have been insufficient to do 
more than retain counsel for the "initial proceedings in his case." Rather, Shackelford 
has merely stated, "The failure to allow a defendant to choose his counsel violates the 
qualified right to choice of counsel." (Brief, p.46) (emphasis in original). 
While the state recognizes Shackelford provided a March 7, 2000 letter from 
James E. Siebe to support his claim (UPCPA, R., pp.2061-62), not only was the letter 
inadmissible hearsay, but it is based upon a contingency that the district court also 
appoint co-counsel and simply lacks any credibility. Siebe initially concedes, "it does not 
appear that the sum total of those amounts would be sufficient to hire an attorney for 
representation in a capital murder case," but then states, "[o]n the other hand, had you 
had this money available to you at the time of your arrest I am not so certain I would not 
have been able to take the case had I a belief that the court would appoint a second chair 
counsel to assist me in that endeavor." (UPCP A, R., pp.2061-62.) 
To survive a motion for sununary dismissal, a post-conviction petition "must 
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations." State v. 
Payne, 2008 WL 5205959, 6 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903». Because Siebe's letter is 
clearly hearsay, it is insufficient to overcome the state's motion for summary dismissal. 
Further, Siebe's statement that he is "not so certain I would not have been able to 
take the case" is not only equivocal, but it is based upon a contingency that the district 
court would have to appoint co-counsel. Shackelford has completely failed to establish, 
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based upon its findings appointing counsel, that the district court would have returned the 
$5,000.00 and then been willing to appoint co-counsel. 
Further, considering Barker and Mahaffey were paid $500,000.00 to represent 
Shackelford, Siebe's claim that he might have taken the case for $5,000.00 is 
preposterous, particularly in light of Shackelford's representation to the district court he 
contacted Siebe and was advised sometime prior to February 15, 2000, "a case of this 
magnitude is going to take at least $100,000." (Pretrial Tr., pp.31-32.) Susan Petersen 
filed an affidavit on April 19, 2000, two months after Shackelford's initial arraignment, 
explaining $31, 537.46 had already been spent for his defense. (R., pp.136-38.) 
Shackelford has failed to establish his right to counsel of choice was violated. 
Shackelford has presented absolutely no evidence he had assets even close to 
$500,000.00. Based upon his complete failure to demonstrate the factual findings of the 
district court are clearly erroneous, Shackelford's claim fails. 
VII. 
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish His Attorneys' Performances Were Objectively 
Unreasonable And That Any Alleged Deficit Would Have Changed The Outcome Of His 
Trial 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford has raised three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Brief, 
pp.46-51.) Initially Shackelford contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
due to his lead attorney, Ray Baker, not being on the Idaho Supreme Court roster of death 
qualified defense attorneys as established by I.C.R. 44.3(6). (Brief, pp.46-47.) Because 
Shackelford has failed to support his claim with citation to authority, it is waived. Should 
this Court address the merits of Shackelford's claim, it still fails because I.C.R. 44.3 was 
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suspended at the time, making it inapposite. Further, the district court expressly found 
Barker met the qualifications for defending a capital murderer. Finally, irrespective of 
I.C.R. 44.3, Shackelford has failed to establish any alleged ineffectiveness stemmed from 
his "lack of qualifications." 
Shackelford next contends he was denied effective assistance due to counsel's 
failure to "adequately" impeach Proctor James Baker ("PJ") and his wife, Katherine 
Baker ("Katherine"), by failing to question PJ regarding his "latest felony" allegedly 
"related to a bombing," and failing to impeach Katherine based upon "inconsistencies" in 
her initial testimony, rebuttal testimony and initial statement to the police. (Brief, ppA 7-
49.) Because Shackelford has failed to support his claim with citation to authority, it is 
waived. Should this Court address the merits of Shackelford's claim, it still fails because 
matters of questioning a witness, particularly impeachment, are trial strategy. 
Shackelford has also failed to establish any alleged deficiency would have changed the 
outcome of his trial. 
Finally, Shackelford contends he was denied effective assistance due to counsel's 
failure to "adequately" prepare defense witnesses, including his arson expert, Don 
Perkins, and ballistics expert, Kay Sweeney. (Brief, pp.49-51.) Specifically, Shackelford 
contends counsel did not have Perkins investigate the fire scene until the evening before 
he testified, did not review the crime scene photographs until the day he testified, did not 
speak with counsel until "just hours before he testified" and provided him with only the 
fire investigation report from the Lewiston Fire Department. (Brief, pA9.) As to 
Sweeney, Shackelford contends counsel failed to provide Sweeney "with the necessary 
foundational support" for an "exhibit to reflect andlor illustrate Mr. Sweeney's opinions." 
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(Brief, pp.50-51.) Because Shackelford has failed to support his claim with citation to 
authority, it is waived. Should this Court address the merits of Shackelford's claim, it 
fails because he has not established counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable 
and that additional preparation would have changed the outcome of his trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for post-conviction claims dismissed without an 
evidentiary hearing is articulated in section V(B) above. 
C. Standards Of Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The unwavering standard in determining whether counsel has provided effective 
assistance of counsel remains the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984), which requires Shackelford establish both deficient performance and 
prejudice. The first element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Id. In making this determination, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance fell within the "wide range of professional assistance." Id. at 689. 
Shackelford has the burden of showing counsel's performance "fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The effectiveness of counsel's performance 
must be evaluated from his perspective at the time of the alleged error, not with twenty-
twenty hindsight. Id. at 689. As explained by the Supreme Court, "There are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense 
attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Id. Strategic and 
tactical choices are "virtually unchallengeable" if made after thorough investigation of 
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the law and facts. Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
unchallengeable if "reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation." rd. at 690-91. 
The review conducted by the federal court is "extremely limited." Coleman v. 
Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, Calderon v. 
Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). As explained by the Ninth Circuit, "The test has nothing 
to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good 
lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial 
could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial." rd. (quoting 
Dyer v. Calderon, 122 F.3d 720, 732 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
While "heightened procedural safeguards" have been applied in other areas of 
capital litigation, the state is unaware of any Supreme Court decision applying such 
standards to the investigation of mitigation. Certainly, no such reference is found in 
Strickland, a capital case, or Burger v. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)), another capital case in which the Court 
concluded, merely because counsel "could ... have made a more thorough investigation 
than he did," does not mandate relief because the courts "address not what is prudent or 
appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled." 
The second element of Strickland requires Shackelford show "counsel's errors 
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
466 U.S. at 687. Shackelford must "affirmatively prove prejudice," Pizzuto v. Arave, 
280 F.3d 949,955 (9 th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693), which requires he 
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors the 
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result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. This is a "highly demanding and heavy burden." Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 
1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394 (2000». In making 
such a determination, a reviewing court "must consider the totality of the evidence before 
the judge or jury." Id. at 695. "[AJ verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the 
record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record 
support." Pizzuto, 280 F.3d at 955 (quoting Strickland, at 696). 
D. Shackelford's Claims OfIneffective Assistance Have Been Waived 
Without citation to Strickland, the two-prong test or any other authority, 
Shackelford has raised the three ineffective assistance of counsel claims detailed above. 
(Brief, pp.46-51.) Because Shackelford has failed to support his claims with authority 
and argument, they are waived. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511; Creech, 132 Idaho at 19. 
However, as detailed below, even if this Court considers Shackelford's claims despite his 
failure to cite any authority, his claims fail. 
E. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Based On Barker Not 
Being On The Supreme Court Roster 
On February 16, 2000, the district court conducted a hearing regarding trial 
counsels' qualifications. The court expressly noted that LC.R. 44.3 had been suspended, 
which Shackelford has never disputed. (Tr., p.42.) Therefore, on that basis alone, 
Shackelford's claim fails. 
Shackelford's claim also fails because the district court conducted a hearing, 
questioned Barker about his qualifications and found "Mr. Barker qualifies by experience 
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to be lead counsel" (Tr., p.42), which is permitted under LC.R. 44.3(8). Shackelford has 
never contended Barker does not meet the requirements for representing a capital 
defendant, only that he was not on the roster of death qualified attomeys. However, 
because of the district court's finding, which Shackelford also has never challenged, 
Shackelford's claim fails. 
Finally, Shackelford's claim also fails because the effectiveness of counsel is not 
judged by a rule or statute, but the two-prong Strickland standard detailed above. As 
explained by the Ohio Court of Appeals: 
(L]ack of certification under c.P.Sup.R. 65 does not automatically create a 
presumption that counsel has not provided effective assistance of counsel. 
The effectiveness of counsel not qualified under this rule must be judged 
under the standard set forth in Strickland, ... , i.e., whether counsel's 
performance was unreasonably deficient and, if so, whether but for that 
deficiency, the result of the proceedings would have been different. 
State v. Misch, 656 N.E.2d 381, 388 (Ohio App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
Idaho has also recognized an attorney's experience, or lack thereof, is not a basis 
for ineffective assistance of counsel. In Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 544, 716 P.2d 
1306 (1986), counsel's having practiced law a mere six months prior to being appointed 
to represent a capital defendant was alleged as a basis for ineffective assistance. 
Recognizing the two-prong Strickland standard, the court rejected this claim, explaining, 
"trial counsel performed conunendable in a most serious and complex criminal case." 
Before the Ninth Circuit, the same claim was rejected with the court again citing the two-
prong Strickland standard and concluding, "Paradis has failed to demonstrate that his trial 
counsel's performance was ineffective because of his inexperience." Paradis v. Arave, 
954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 1026 (1993), 
relief denied, 20 F.3d 950 (1994). 
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Because Shackelford has failed to even allege, let alone actually establish, any 
basis for ineffective assistance based solely upon Barker's alleged lack of qualifications 
or that he was not on the roster of death qualified attorneys, his claim fails. 
F. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Based Upon 
Counsel's Questioning Of State Witnesses 
P J testified that during the evening on March 28, 1999, Shackelford drove to P J' s 
house without his headlights on, came into P.T's house, explained he was driving without 
headlights because he did not want anyone to know he was there, said, "Donna is no 
more," and asked PJ to provide him with an alibi and how ifPJ "had two bodies to get rid 
of, how would [he] do it." (Tr., pp.1914-16.) The next day Shackelford returned to PJ's 
home, who told Shackelford, "I think you did it," to which Shackelford did not respond. 
(Tr., p.19l9.) 
Prior to PJ testifying, the district court held a hearing to discuss any potential 
limitations on Shackelford's ability to impeach PJ based upon his prior felony conviction 
and his being granted immnnity from the state based upon his having possessed a firearm 
as a convicted felony with the court concluding PJ could be questioned regarding both. 
(Tr., pp.1907-10.) Before the jury, PJ conceded he was a convicted felon (Tr., pp.1919-
20), and because he was a convicted felon and handled a handgun given to him by Brian 
Abitz, the state provided him immuuity from prosecution based upon his testimony (Tr., 
pp.1921-23). On cross-examination, PJ was again questioned regarding a letter written 
by the state providing him with immunity, which was admitted as an exhibit. (Tr., 
pp.1926-29.) 
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Katherine confirmed Shackelford drove up to their house on May 28, without 
headlights. (Tr., p.1944.) Katherine also confirmed that the following day, which was 
the day of the Locust Blossom Festival, Shackelford retumed to their home at 
approximatly 12:30. (Tr., pp.1945-46.) During rebuttal, the state attempted to establish 
Bud Adamson had not come to Katherine's house on May 29, and when asked, why she 
was so certain Adamson had not been there, she responded, "Because we were home all 
day, no one came up Saturday." (Tr., p.5141.) In her initial statement to the police, 
Katherine allegedly failed to indicate Shackelford was at her home on May 29. 
Katherine was not questioned at trial regarding the alleged discrepancy. 
As explained in Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 368, 877 P.2d 365 (1994), 
"counsel's choice of witnesses, marmer of cross-examination, and lack of objection to 
testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions." A nearly identical issue 
was raised in Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 576-77 (9th Cir. 2005), where the petitioner 
contended his attomey was ineffective for not impeaching a state's witness with a prior 
conviction for possession of PCP with intent to sell. Noting the witness had already 
advised the jury of his extensive drug use and that he was on probation for a criminal 
conviction, the court concluded the witness' "credibility was so undermined anyway that 
evidence that he also had a conviction for possession with intent to sell PCP would not 
have affected the outcome." Id. 
In Parker v. Kemna, 260 F.3d 852, 853-54 (8 th Cir. 2001), the court examined the 
cross-examination of a state's witness and concluded additional impeachment evidence 
with prior inconsistent statements "would not completely destroy [the witness' credibility 
and render his testimony worthless." See also Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 655, 946 
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P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1997) (an informed tactical decision regarding impeachment of 
witnesses "should not be second-guessed in the consideration of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim"). 
Shackelford has also failed to establish prejudice. The jury was already aware PJ 
was a convicted felon and the state had granted him immunity. Moreover, Shackelford 
has failed to establish that either a prior "conviction related to a bombing" or an "assault 
on a federal officer" (Brief, p.48) would be admissible pursuant to LR.E. 609(a) for 
impeachment purposes. Shackelford has not even established the time limit for these 
alleged prior convictions. See LR.E. 609(b ) (establishing a ten-year limit on the use of a 
prior felony for impeachment purposes). Additionally, merely stacking felonies by 
establishing PJ allegedly had been convicted of a felony "related to a bomb" or "assault 
on a federal officer" would not have further impeached his testimony. In fact, neither 
Shackelford's Third Amended Petition (UPCPA, R., pp.37-38) or his brief provide the 
basis for this claim, i.e., evidence that PJ had been actually convicted of a felony "related 
to a bomb" or an "assault on a federal officer." Because it is Shackelford's burden to 
provide an adequate record on appeal, any missing portions are presumed to support the 
actions of the district court. State v. Comih 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 
1999). Therefore, not only does Shackelford's claim fail on the merits, it fails because it 
is not supported by the record he supplied on appeal. 
Shackelford's claim regarding Katherine likewise fails. First, there is no evidence 
establishing Katherine provided a written statement to police. Rather, the "initial 
statement" to which Shackelford refers is merely a police report synopsizing an interview 
of Katherine by Deputy Aston. (UP CPA, R., pp.1084-90.) In fact, the report actually 
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states Adamson did not come to the Baker residence until the following Monday, but 
Shackelford came to the Baker residence "close to the time of the fire" and talked with PJ 
who later reported to Katherine that Shackelford had requested P J provide him an alibi. 
(UP CPA, R., pp.l087-88.) Unquestionably, counsel did not want to solidify Katherine's 
testimony by questioning her regarding her prior conversation with Deputy Aston. 
Similarly, by challenging Katherine's rebuttal testimony, which was focused upon 
Adamson, counsel would not have wanted the prosecutor to clarify any alleged 
discrepancy with Katherine's prior testimony or her statement to Deputy Aston. 
Finally, Shackelford has failed to explain how further impeachment of these two 
witnesses would have changed the outcome of his trial. While the witnesses' testimony 
was important, it paled in comparison to the other evidence establishing his guilt. 
G. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Based Upon 
Counsel's Alleged Failure To "Adequately" Prepare Perkins 
Contrary to Shackelford's contention, counsel did not provide Perkins "only ... 
with the fire investigation report form the Lewiston Fire Department." (Brief, pp.49-S0.) 
Perkins expressly testified he was provided with the following 
A copy of the Dreary Fire Department incident report, a copy of the 
Lewiston fire report and the investigation report. You provided me a copy 
of Mr. Don Howard's report, you also provided me testimony, the 
courtroom testimony, of Mr. Don Howard. You provided me with the 
report from Mr. Lauper, the Idaho State fire Marshall, and his report and 
also his testimony. 
You also provided me some photographs of the fire scene taken by 
investigators. And you've also provided me with some additional written 
statements, written by Gary Fontaine and Ted Meske on the evening of 
this incident. I also had the opportunity to visit the fire scene late 
yesterday afternoon. There was a foot of snow. . . .. But I ended up 
shoveling the whole pad where the remains of the garage was. I shoveled 
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off the whole pad so that I could physically see the burn patterns and the 
materials that were left that's been shown me in photographs provided. 
(Tr., pp.4526-27.) 
Perkins testified regarding what he had learned as a result of reviewing the 
information provided to him by counsel, including the Dreary Fire incident report (Tr., 
pp.4533-34), the Lewiston fire report (Tr., pp.4535-36, 4548-49), photographs (Tr., 
pp.4536-40, 4550) the statement provided by Ted (Tr., pp.4546-48), and Don Howard's 
report (Tr., pp.4549-50). Perkins also discussed a "time line" that was based upon the 
documents counsel provided. (Tr., pp.4540-50.) As a result of the information provided 
by counsel, Perkins rendered an opinion that the cause of the fire "should be determined 
undetermined ... [w]ith suspicious circumstances." (Tr., p.4567.) Perkins conceded his 
opinion was "different" than Don Howard and Gleun Lauper's opinions, "because their --
the information they provided to me would be -- there was too much inferences, too much 
assumptions, speculation." (Tr., p.4572.) 
Similarly, the record does not support Shackelford's contention that Perkins did 
not review "pre-fire garage photos." The actually testimony to which Shackelford refers 
involves a single photograph, exhibit 205; the state is unaware of any testimony that 
Perkins did not review any pre-fire garage photos. (Tr., p.4600.) 
Merely because Perkins did not have any materials until November 21, 2000,1 
does not establish deficient performance. Further, counsel may very well not have 
wanted Shackelford interviewed by Perkins because, if the interview provided a basis for 
Perkins' opinion, it could have provided the state another inconsistent statement from 
7 Shackelford actually indicates it was mid-November 2001. (Brief, p.50.) However, 
Perkins agreed it was "probably" "November 21 $I of this year." (Tr., p.4588.) Because 
"this year" was 2000, the state assumes this was a typographical error by Shackelford. 
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Shackelford. Simply stated, Shackelford has failed to establish counsel's preparation of 
Perkins was objectively unreasonable based upon the minor "deficiencies" Shackelford 
alleges. Rather, his allegations are based upon pure speCUlation, failing to establish any 
benefit from providing Perkins with additional material or preparation. See Thomas v. 
State, 145 Idaho 765, 769, 185 P.3d 921 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Thomas's allegations about 
the escort possibly receiving some benefit for her testimony are pure speculation"); 
Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 44, 936 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1997) ("If counsel ... had 
additional time to prepare for Sorini' s testimony, as Matthews asserts he should have, 
Matthews has not demonstrated how this additional time would have benefited his case"). 
More importantly, Shackelford has completely failed to establish how, even if 
counsel had done everything asserted by Shackelford, the result of the trial would have 
been different. Rather, his allegations are based upon pure speculation. See id. As 
explained in Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 370, 924 P.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1996), 
"Assuming Cootz's allegations to be true, there is nothing in the record to indicate how 
these witnesses might have testified and how their testimony might have affected the 
outcome of the trial." Like Cootz, Shackelford has failed to provide any evidence 
explaining how, if Perkins had been better prepared, that additional preparation would 
have affected the outcome of the trial. Because Shackelford has failed to meet that 
burden, his claim fails, and the district court properly summarily dismissed this claim. 
H. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Based Upon 
Counsel's Alleged Failure To "Adequately" Prepare Sweeney 
During the course of his testimony, Sweeney explained that, based upon his 
review of various reports provided by the state, he created exhibit MMM, "a scale 
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representation of the stairs at the scene of the fire that goes up the side of the garage to 
the upper floor and the position of the door and a landing at the top of the stairs is called 
and diagramed. And then a trajectory line representing a 20-degree angle of shot to the 
door is extended out to 87 feet from the door." (Tr., pp.4809-11.) The state objected to 
introduction of exhibit MMM because "it is misleading. I think the witness can testify to 
his conclusions as to whether 20 degrees is a correct angle. In my opinion that simply 
overstates the angle as opposed to understating it, but I believe he can testify to that. But 
I believe this exhibit is misleading." (Tr., pp.4828-29.) The court sustained the state's 
objection, concluding, "I think this exhibit is misleading as well. I don't think it -- it 
suggests that the angle from 87 feet at 20 degrees is perpendicular to the landing and I 
don't think that's -- I think that is in conflict with the physical locale." (Tr., p.4829.) 
Shackelford contends if counsel had "adequately prepared Mr. Sweeney and 
provided him the necessary tools to support his opinion," exhibit MMM would have been 
admitted. (Brief, p.51.) However, Shackelford has completely failed to identify what 
additional preparation or "necessary tools" would have resulted in admission of exhibit 
MMM. On this basis alone, Shackelford has failed to establish the district court erred by 
summarily dismissing this claim. 
Additionally, it appears Shackelford sought admission of exhibit MMM for 
merely illustrative purposes (Tr., p.4829); Sweeney testified regarding his ultimate 
conclusions stemming from the exhibit and his investigation (Tr., pp.4830-31). At best, 
exhibit MMM was merely cumulative evidence, which would not have changed the 
outcome of Shackelford's trial. See Coble v. Ouarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 
2007) ("Counsel's decision not to present cumulative testimony does not constitute 
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ineffective assistance"); Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,959 (9th Cir. 2002) (no prejudice 
if evidence was merely cumulative); Clairborne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 
1995) (failure to show prejudice where testimony was "essentially redundant"). 
VIII. 
Based Upon Shackelford's Failure To Demonstrate Any Error, His Claim Of Cumulative 
Error Necessarily Fails 
Finally, Shackelford contends if any of the errors alleged above are found to be 
harmless, under the "cumulative error doctrine" this Court should reverse his convictions. 
(Brief, p.51.) Before this Court can find cumulative error, it must first find error. "When 
there is an 'accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but 
when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial,' the cumulative error 
doctrine requires a reversal of the conviction as the trial has contravened the defendant's 
right to due process." State v. Payne, 2008 WL 5205959, *15 (2008) (quoting State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174 (1998». However, because Shackelford has 
failed to demonstrate error, let alone an aggregate of harmless errors, this Court cannot 
reverse based on the cumulative error doctrine. 
IX. 
Because Neither Ring v. Arizona Nor Idaho Law Required The Jury To Conduct The 
Weighing Process, The District Court Erred By Granting Post-Conviction Relief Under 
Ring 
A. Introduction 
By way of cross-appeal, the state submits the district court erred as a matter of 
law when it granted post-conviction relief based upon Ring v. Arizona, because neither 
Ring nor Idaho law required the jury to conduct the weighing process. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Nunez, 131 Idaho 408, 409, 958 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1998); 
State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 246,796 P.2d 121 (1990). 
C. Facts Regarding The District Court's Granting Of Post-Conviction Sentencing 
Relief Based Upon Ring 
On June 30, 2000, Shackelford filed a motion seeking a jury determination of 
statutory aggravating factors and an "advisory verdict by a jury to return a special verdict 
in compliance with Idaho Code § 19-2525 indicating whether or not mitigating 
circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances as to make imposition of the death 
penalty unjust." (R., pp.413-14.) Initially, the district court declined to address the issue. 
(Tr., pp.711-18.) However, the court subsequently denied the motion without prejudice 
because it was premature. (R., p.l526.) The jury returned guilty verdicts on December 
22, 2000, none of which involved the weighing of statutory aggravating factors and 
mitigation. (R., pp.2223-28.) After the jury convicted him, the district court denied 
Shackelford's jury sentencing motions. (R., pp.2687-89.) On October 25, 2001, the 
district court read and filed its Finding of the Court in Considering Death Penalty, 
imposing the death penalty for both counts of first-degree murder. (R., pp.3082-116.) 
The Judgment of Conviction was filed November I, 2001. (R., pp.3120-27.) 
Shackelford commenced post-conviction proceedings on December 6, 200 I. 
(UPCPA, R., pp.IO-35.) On June 24, 2002, while his post-conviction case was still 
pending, the Supreme Court issued Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002), expressly 
overruling, in pati, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990), which had held ajudge, 
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sitting without a Jury, was permitted to find statutory aggravating factors even if 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty, and found that a jury must now find the 
statutory aggravating circumstances before a death sentence can be imposed. Finding the 
jury's verdict established Shackelford murdered Donna and Fred at the same location and 
date, a finding Shackelford does not challenge on appeal, the district court concluded the 
jury had found the multiple-murder aggravator of I.C. § 19-2515(9)(b), beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (UP CPA, R., p.3579.) However, the court also concluded Ring 
mandated the jury conduct the weighing process and, therefore, granted post-conviction 
sentencing relief, ordering that Shackelford's death sentences be "set aside." (UPCPA, 
R., pp.3580-84.) It is from this order the state filed its cross-appeal. 
D. Ring Does Not Require The Jury To Conduct The Weighing Process 
Analysis of whether a jury is mandated to conduct the weighing process in capital 
cases begins with Ring, which noted the issue before the Supreme Court was narrow: 
whether an aggravating circumstance under the Arizona statute operated as the functional 
equivalent of an element so that it must be found by a jury based on the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee to the right to a jury trial. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4. Because the 
weighing function conducted by the district court was not the "functional equivalent of an 
element of a greater offense, the jury was not mandated to determine whether the 
"mitigating circumstances which may be presented [were) sufficiently compelling that 
the death penalty would be unjust." I.C. § 19-2515(c) (2000). 
At the time of Shackelford's sentencing, the imposition of the death penalty was 
governed by I.C. § 19-2515 (2000). Specifically, after a plea or verdict of guilty of first-
degree murder, I.C. § 19-2S15(a) (2000) required the district court to "convene a hearing 
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to receive evidence and argument in aggravation and mitigation of the punishment." 
Idaho Code § 19-2515( c) (2000) prohibited the imposition of the death penalty unless a 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty had been filed in compliance with I.C. § 18-
8004A "and the court finds at least one (l) statutory aggravating circumstance." "Where 
the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence the 
defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be 
presented are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust." I.e. § 19-
2515(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
Based upon Idaho's prior statutory scheme, once a defendant was convicted of 
first-degree murder and the district court found a statutory aggravator, the maximum 
penalty was death. The finding of mitigation and the determination that the mitigation 
was "sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust" did not increase the 
maximum penalty, but actually reduced the penalty to life with a ten year minimum. 
Other courts have carefully examined Ring and the Supreme Court's capital 
litigation jurisprudence and recognized Ring does not require jUl1es to conduct the 
weighing process before the death penalty can be imposed. In State v. Gales, 658 
N.W.2d 604, 611 (Neb. 2003), the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that Ring 
marks the convergence of two lines of federal constitutional authority: one 
addressing procedures which states must follow in order to implement 
capital punishment in conformity with the Eighth Amendment, and the 
other dealing with the extent to which the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 
right to a jury determination of the existence of facts which increase the 
penalty for a crime. 
Examining numerous Supreme Court decisions regarding Eighth Amendment capital 
sentencing requirements after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Nebraska 
court recognized Nebraska's capital sentencing procedure was similar to that of many 
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other states which "employed a process of determining and balancing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances." Gales, 658 N.W.2d at 614. The court further explained: 
The U. S. Supreme Court has characterized this process as consisting of an 
"eligibility decision," in which there must be a determination of the 
existence of one or more of the prescribed aggravating circumstances 
before a defendant convicted of a capital crime is eligible for a sentence of 
death, and a "selection decision," in which the sentencer determines 
whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive it, 
based upon an individualized determination of the character of the 
individual and the circumstances of the crime. 
Id. After reviewing numerous Supreme Court Sixth Amendment cases, Ring, and 
Nebraska's death penalty statutes, the court rejected the contention that Ring mandates 
juries weigh mitigation and aggravation, reasoning: 
It is the determination of "death eligibility" which exposes the defendant 
to greater punishment, and such exposure triggers the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury determination as delineated in Apprendi and Ring. In 
contrast, the determination of mitigating circumstances, the balancing of 
aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, and 
proportionality review are part of the "selection decision" in capital 
sentencing, which, under the current and prior statutes, occurs only after 
eligibility has been determined. [Citation omitted]. These determinations 
cannot increase the potential punishment to which a defendant is exposed 
as a consequence of the eligibility determination. 
Id. at 628. 
In Oken v. Maryland, 835 S.2d 1105 (Md. 2003), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
took a similar approach. Examining the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, 
the court concluded: 
Ring only implicates the finding of aggravating circumstances, and not the 
process of weighing aggravating against mitigating factors. Of particular 
import is that jurisprudence which distinguishes those elements of the 
sentencing process which make a defendant death-eligible from those 
elements involved in selecting those death-eligible defendants who 
actually will be sentenced to death. 
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Id. at 1122. After examining and explaining the differences between "weighing" and 
"non-weighing" states, the court further explained: 
In both weighing and non-weighing schemes, it is the finding of an 
aggravating circumstance which makes the defendant death-eligible. The 
selection process that follows determines, nnder both weighing and non-
weighing statutes, whether, in the judgment of the sentencing authority, 
the penalty actually should be applied. 
rd. at 1123. After completing its review of Supreme Court precedent, the court 
determined: 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated, as has the legislative 
history of the Maryland statute, that it is the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances which makes a convicted defendant death-
eligible. It is this finding which performs the function of narrowing the 
class of eligible defendants as required by Furman. By reverse 
implication, it is also this finding which exposes the convicted defendant 
to the statutory maximum. Ring, which by its terms addresses only the 
finding of aggravating circumstances, makes clear that these are opposite 
sides of the same coin. We therefore conclude that the selection phase of 
the sentencing process, involving weighing, is not affected by the 
requirements of Ring. 
rd. at 1157-58. 
Texas has likewise rejected Shackelford's argument, recognizing, "The mitigation 
issue does not increase the statutory minimum. To the contrary, the mitigation issue is 
designed to allow for imposition of a life sentence, which is less than the statutory 
maximum." Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521,534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (emphasis in 
original). Likewise, Oklahoma has concluded: 
Ring describes a substantive element of a capital offense as one which 
makes an increase in authorized pnnishment contingent on a finding of 
fact. Using this description, the substantive element of capital murder in 
Oklahoma is the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance necessary 
to support a capital sentence. It is that finding, not the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that authorizes jurors to 
consider imposing a sentence of death. That is, the increase in punishment 
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from life imprisonment without parole to the death penalty is contingent 
on the factual finding of an aggravating circumstance. 
Torres v. State, 58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (footnote omitted). 
The Delaware Supreme Court is in accord. In Brice v. Delaware, 815 A.2d 314, 
322 (Del. 2003) (footnote omitted), the court explained: 
Although a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death without finding 
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, it is not that 
determination that increases the maximum punishment. Rather, the 
maximum punishment is increased by the finding of the statutory 
aggravator. At that point a judge can sentence a defendant to death, but 
only if the judge finds that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors. Therefore, the weighing of aggravating circumstances against 
mitigating circumstances does not increase the punishment. Rather, it 
ensures that the punishment imposed is appropriate and proportional. 
The California Supreme Court rejected Shackelford's argument because "once the 
defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special 
circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more than the 
prescribed statutory maximum for the offense." People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1147 
(Cal. 2003). The weighing associated with mitigation merely determines "'whether a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence. ", Id. 
(quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994». "As such, the penalty phase 
determination is inherently moral and normative, not factual." Id. (citation omitted). 
Tennessee, State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 864 (Tenn. 2004), Illinois, People v. 
Ballard, 794 N .E.2d 788, 821 (Ill. 2002), and Alabama, In re Waldrop, 859 So.2d 1181, 
1189 (Ala. 2002), have also determined the weighing process is not a "factual 
determination" that requires a jury finding under Ring. 
The district court's reliance upon cases from Nevada, Colorado, Arizona and 
Missouri was misplaced. (UPCPA, R., pp.3580-84.) In Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 
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460 (Nev. 2002) (quoting Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.554(3) (emphasis in original)), the Nevada 
Supreme Court examined its state statutes and concluded, "Nevada statutory law requires 
two distinct findings to render a defendant death-eligible: 'The jury or the panel of judges 
may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and 
further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstance of circumstances found.'" Clearly, I.C. § 19-2515(c) does not 
contain the same conjunctive language. 
In Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-
11-103 (2000)), the court addressed a similar statute establishing a three judge panel 
could not impose a death sentence unless it found "(A) At least one aggravating factor 
has been proved; and (B) There are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the 
aggravating factor or factors that are proved." Because "insufficient mitigating factors to 
outweigh the aggravating factor" had to be proven before death could be imposed, the 
court concluded Ring mandated jury weighing in Colorado. Id. at 266-67. 
The same is true in Missouri, which requires the jury to impose "life 
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole or release except by act of the 
governor" if the jury "does not" make four distinct findings, including: (l) at least one 
statutory aggravating factor; (2) the aggravation evidence warrants imposing the death 
penalty; (3) the mitigation does not outweigh the aggravation evidence; and (4) under 
"all the circumstances" the death penalty is appropriate. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 
253,258 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030.4). 
Arizona's statute, while similar to I.C. § 19-25l5(c), was markedly different 
because the Arizona courts were required to impose a death sentence only "if the court 
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finds one or more aggravating circumstance . . . and that there are no mitigating 
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(F) 
(West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Ballard, 794 N.E.2d at 821 (distinguishing 
Arizona's statute). Because the death penalty could not be imposed unless the fact-finder 
"conclude[d] that the mitigating factors are not sufficiently substantial to call for 
leniency," the Arizona Supreme Court determined the implicit finding by a jury of a 
statutory aggravating factor was insufficient to establish a defendant's capital sentence 
resulted from harmless error. State v. Ring. 65 P.3d 915,942-43 (Ariz. 2003) (Ring lID. 
As detailed above, because the weighing of mitigating factors under I.C. § 19-
2515( c) does not increase the penalty from life to death, but actually reduces the penalty 
from death to life, the weighing process is not the functional equivalent of an element of 
a greater offense and, therefore, the jury was not mandated to complete the weighing 
process in Shackelford's case. 
Finally, in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 783-84, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004), the 
Idaho Supreme Court indicated the weighing process is not the functional equivalent of 
an element of a greater offense. Addressing the question of whether a '''trial by jury in 
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice' and that its most 
important element is 'the right to have the jury, rather than the judge reach the requisite 
finding of guilty, '" the supreme court explained: 
Section 19-2515 did not define a separate crime of capital first-degree 
murder. It merely set forth the procedures that must be followed in order 
to impose a death sentence, defined the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, and required that at least one aggravating circumstance be 
found beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant could be sentenced to 
death. Ring did not elevate those statutory aggravating circumstances into 
elements of a crime, nor did it create a new crime .... Ring merely held 
that a state cannot impose the death penalty unless its sentencing 
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procedures have the jury, not the judge, determine the existence of a 
statutory aggravating factor. 
Id. at 784. 
Based upon Porter, it is clear this Court understands the procedural aspects of I.C. 
§ 19-2515 as it existed at the time of Shackelford's sentencing and that a jury was not 
required, under Ring orIdaho law, to conduct the weighing required in I.C. § 19-2515(c). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Shackelford's judgments of conviction and 
death sentences be affirmed. The state further requests that this Court affirm the decision 
of the district court denying post-conviction relief, but reverse the court's conclusion that 
Shackelford be granted sentencing relief under Ring. requiring that he be resentenced. 
Because the district court did not address all of Shackelford's post-conviction claims, but 
found some of them moot because the court granted sentencing relief, the state further 
requests that his case be remanded for a final determination regarding those claims. 
DATED this 31 st day of December, 2008. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigatio nit 
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